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Introduction
Eva Rowe’s parents, James and Linda Rowe, were both killed by
an explosion at a British Petroleum (“BP”) refinery in Texas City,
Texas in March 2005. 1 Thirteen other workers were killed, and 170
people were injured when an outdated piece of equipment overfilled
with a highly flammable liquid and ignited.2 Before the explosion, a
2003 external audit found a “checkbook mentality” at the refinery and
that the infrastructure was “poor.”3
Ms. Rowe testified before the U.S. House Education and Labor
Committee that she believed that BP murdered her parents with its
corporate culture of greed for profits and requested legislation that
would increase safety inspections in order to protect workers from
future accidents.4 She ultimately settled her lawsuit against BP for an
undisclosed amount after seeking 1.2 billion dollars in damages. In
addition to monetary damages, Ms. Rowe’s attorney said that the
settlement included an agreement that BP would improve safety at the
refinery and other facilities.5
Exactly a year later, in March 2006, more than 200,000 barrels of
crude oil spilled from a pipeline at BP’s Prudhoe Bay oil field in Alaska.6
1.

BP Explosion Civil Lawsuit Settled, CBS News (Nov. 9, 2006, 10:20 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/bp-explosion-civil-lawsuit-settled/ [https:
//perma.cc/DBK4-Q2YC]. Katy Byron, BP Plant Explosion Suit Settled
for $32 million, CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/11/09/refin
ery.suit/index.html (Nov. 10, 2006, 5:24 AM).

2.

Id.

3.

Id.

4.

House Committee on Education and Labor, BP-Texas City Disaster
Hearing: Eva Rowe Testimony, YouTube (May 1, 2007), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=3nlqLK0JQ8M&feature=youtu.be (showing Eva
Rowe’s testimony on March 22, 2007 before the U.S. House Education
and Labor Committee).

5.

BP Explosion Civil Lawsuit Settled, supra note 1.

6.

BP to Pay Out $25m for 200,000-gallon Alaska Oil Spill in 2006, The
Guardian (May 4, 2011, 7:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2011/may/04/bp-25m-north-slope-oil-spill [https://perma.c
c/A5VV-XJLV].
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BP admitted that it “failed to adequately maintain its pipelines.”7 BP
was later fined twenty-five million dollars, the largest per-barrel penalty
ever imposed at that time.8
And then, almost exactly four years later, in April 2010, a BP oil
exploration project at the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, killing
eleven workers and spilling four million barrels of oil over an eightyseven-day period and resulting in the “largest spill of oil in the history
of marine oil drilling operations.”9 Eventually, BP “paid $75 billion in
clean-water fees, legal settlements, grants to Gulf Coast researchers and
state governments.”10
These are only some of the BP disasters. After each event, BP faced
a variety of efforts to hold it accountable and control its activities.11
Despite these efforts and despite changes in BP leadership, BP
continued to engage in behavior that harms individuals, communities,
itself, and the environment.12
Why are traditional remedies and forms of accountability some–
times ineffective in altering the behavior of organizations and groups of
organizations that cause harm? This article hypothesizes that some
systems are triggered, meaning that they have experienced trauma and
7.

Id.

8.

Id.

9.

Deepwater Horizon—BP Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, EPA, https://www.
epa.gov/enforcement/deepwater-horizon-bp-gulf-mexico-oil-spill [https://
perma.cc/UB4D-UBT4] (last updated Dec. 4, 2020).

10.

Steven Mufson, Ten Years After Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill, Trump
Administration Weakens Regulations, Wash. Post (Apr. 19, 2020, 4:30
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/ten-years-af
ter-gulf-of-mexico-oil-spill-trump-administration-weakens-reforms/2020/04
/19/f935ec1c-7ffc-11ea-8013-1b6da0e4a2b7_story.html [https://perma.cc/
3PEX-AN8K].

11.

See BP Fined $2.4M for Refinery Safety Problems, CNN Money (Apr. 25,
2006, 6:30 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2006/04/25/news/companies/
bp_fine/ [https://perma.cc/6FEE-YCH7] (detailing the Department of
Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration $2.4 million fine
against BP for conditions in the Oregon, Ohio refinery that were remin–
iscent of conditions in their Texas City refinery which exploded the previous
year); Most Oil Companies in MTBE Lawsuits Settle, NBC News (May 9,
2008, 3:27 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna24541226 [https://
perma.cc/4AYZ-S7ZG] (outlining a class-action lawsuit finding a variety of
oil companies, including BP, liable for water contamination when the
gasoline additive MTBE was found in water systems across the country).

12.

Abrahm Lustgarten & Ryan Knutson, Reports at BP over Years Find
History of Problems, Wash. Post (Jun. 8, 2010), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704826_pf.
html [https://perma.cc/C6K4-NCCP] (“A series of internal investigations
over the past decade warned senior BP managers that the oil company
repeatedly disregarded safety and environmental rules and risked a serious
accident if it did not change its ways.”).
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act out in destructive or self-destructive, trauma-responsive ways.
Many traditional forms of control—formal law, social and cultural
pressures, and market forces—are insufficient to alter these systems and
produce meaningful social change. Therefore, in addition to traditional
forms of control, accountability for triggered systems must include
trauma transforming prescriptions.
The goal is not to move harmful systems into a posture of victim;
instead, the goal is to develop law and policy that produces lasting
social change. Consideration of systemic trauma is not intended to
excuse harmful behavior; instead, the goal is to find more effective ways
of ending it. Trauma-informed systemic remedies should supplement,
not replace, existing remedies. And trauma-informed remedies should
be viewed as part of long-term strategies to address social injustice,
rather than an immediate fix to some of the more urgent and existential
challenges.
This article proposes a new legal theory—Traumatized Systems
Theory. Traumatized Systems Theory considers the implications of
social science research concerning organizational trauma for law and
offers an area for further research, systems transformation—the
identification and healing of triggered systems. Currently, two failed
approaches to triggered systems perpetuate recurrent harm: 1) inverse
accountability and 2) symptom-focused remedies. Inverse account–
ability means that individuals are held accountable for the outcomes of
trauma caused by systems. When individuals suffer or are punished for
responding to trauma that is inflicted, facilitated, funded, enabled or
ignored by systems, accountability is inverse. The systems that cause
the individual trauma are often not held accountable. Symptom-focused
remedies are responses to systemic harm that address the harms or
outcomes, without addressing the traumatic origins of the behavior.
Often, symptom-focused remedies have exclusive or primary goals of
controlling recurrent systemic harms or promoting efficiency. Instead,
Traumatized Systems Theory hypothesizes that law and policy should
facilitate trauma-informed systemic transformation as an equally
important goal.
Part I sets the focus on recurrent systemic harm and provides
examples from various areas of society. Part II discusses trauma and
trauma response. Part III describes traumatized systems. Part IV
presents Traumatized Systems Theory. Part V discusses precedent for
considering the systemic mind when fashioning accountability. Finally,
Part VI offers systems transformation as a supplemental approach to
addressing triggered systems and recurrent systemic harm.

I.

Recurrent Systemic Harm

A starting point for Traumatized Systems Theory is recurrent
systemic harm. Recurrent systemic harm is systemic harm done to

990

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
Traumatized Systems Theory

individuals and communities that persists despite efforts to remedy it.13
When harm is recurrent, legislative, regulatory, judicial, or market
penalties may have the effect of temporarily diminishing or stopping
the harm. But the harm returns later. Because some harmful systemic
behavior is trauma-driven, traditional remedies are insufficient to
address it. Focusing on recurrent harm does not rule out the possibility
that a single harmful act may be trauma responsive; however, initially,
the central concern is recurrent systemic harm because it may be more
indicative of systemic trauma response.
A.

Defining Systems

The political, scholarly, and social critiques of dysfunctional
institutions and systems are extensive. Many people have identified
“the system,” “the man,” or “them” as the cause of social ills, both
colloquially and in scholarship and practice.14 These faulty institutions
and systems may be public, like government agencies;15 private, like

13.

For an explanation of one form of systemic harm, systemic racism, and how
minority communities are greatly impacted by a holistic societal problem,
see What Systemic Racism Means and The Way It Harms Communities,
NPR (Jul. 1, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/01/885878
564/what-systemic-racism-means-and-the-way-it-harms-communities
[https://perma.cc/AH4Q-QCD9].

14.

See Richard J. Holden, People or Systems? To Blame is Human. The Fix
is to Engineer, 54 Pro. Safety 34 (2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.
gov/pmc/articles/PMC3115647/ [https://perma.cc/494W-P4RY] (discu–
ssing tendency to blame individuals rather than systems); see also
Stephan J. Nolan, Referred Pain: Is the Tort System to Blame for Medical
Malpractice Claims?, 37 Md. Bar J. 38 (2004).

15.

See, e.g., Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility and
the Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for Asylum, 56 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 457, 460 (2016) (describing design and effect of immigration court and
adjudication); Samantha Buckingham, Trauma Informed Juvenile Justice,
53 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 641, 663–64 (2016) (describing juvenile justice
system counter-productive approach to juvenile offenders); Erik Luna,
Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 71,
105–10 (2009) (discussing government actions under the Patriot Act);
Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J. Animal
L. & Ethics 63, 71–93 (2006) (discussing a dismissive approach of law to
animal cruelty); William Wesley Patton, When the Empirical Base
Crumbles: The Myth that Open Dependency Proceedings do not
Psychologically Damage Abused Children, 33 L. & Psych. Rev. 29, 36–44
(2009) (describing trauma caused by open dependency proceedings).
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media and entertainment entities;16 hybrid, like the education system17
and prison-industrial complex; 18 or social power structures, like
patriarchy, white supremacy, imperialism, or capitalism. Scholars and
practitioners have observed the many ways that institutions and
systems inflict harm on individuals and communities.19
16.

See, e.g., Ann Wagner & Rachel Wagley McCann, Prostitutes or Prey? The
Evolution of Congressional Intent in Combating Sex Trafficking, 54 Harv.
J. on Legis. 17, 67 (2017) (describing the role of media in perpetuating
child victimization in sex trafficking). See also Robert H. Wood, Violent
Video Games: More Ink Spilled than Blood—An Analysis of the 9th Circuit
Decision in Video Software Dealers Association v. Schwarzenegger, 10
Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports L. 103, 108–10 (discussing non-regulation of
violent video game industry despite possible psychological trauma to
minors).

17.

See, e.g., Jeannie Suk Gersen, The Socratic Method in the Age of Trauma,
130 Harv. L. Rev. 2320, 2324–37 (2017) (describing terror as a university
practice); Judith A. Reisman & Mary E. McAlister, Materials Deemed
Harmful to Minors are Welcomed into Classrooms and Libraries via
Educational “Obscenity Exemptions”, 12 Liberty U. L. Rev. 517, 530–37
(2018) (describing sexual indoctrination of school curriculum); Judith A.M.
Scully, Examining and Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline:
Strategies for a Better Future, 68 Ark. L. Rev. 959, 987–90 (2016)
(discussing emotional trauma that children in the school-to-prison pipeline
may experience); Joseph O. Oluwole, “Danger or Resort to Underwear”:
The Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding Standard for Strip
Searching Public School Students, 41 St. Mary’s L.J. 479, 496–97 (2010)
(discussing the trauma a child may experience from school strip searches).

18.

See, e.g., Craig Haney, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement:
A Systematic Critique, 47 Crime & Just. 365, 370–78 (2018) (discussing
trauma impact of solitary confinement); Bernice B. Donald & Marcus
Gadson, Rethinking Solitary Confinement, 31 Crim. Just. 1 (2016) (same);
Ashley Fansher & Rolando V. del Carmen, “The Child as Witness”:
Evaluating State Statutes on the Court’s Most Vulnerable Population, 36
Child.’s Legal Rts. J. 1, 2–14 (2016) (discussing impact of court
proceedings on children); Nahama Broner, Stacy S. Lamon, Damon W.
Mayrl & Martin G. Karopkin, Arrested Adults Awaiting Arraignment:
Mental Health, Substance Abuse, and Criminal Justice Characteristics and
Needs, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 663, 675 (2003) (discussing trauma effect of
arrest and arraignment).

19.

See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Making Waves or Keeping Calm?: Analyzing
the Institutional Culture of Family Courts through the Lens of Social
Psychology Groupthink Theory, 34 L. & Psych. Rev. 55, 56 (2010)
(describing groupthink and group decisionmaking adversely impacting
parties in the family court system); Nina Rabin, Victims or Criminals?
Discretion, Sorting, and Bureaucratic Culture in the U.S. Immigration
System, 23 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Soc. Just. 195, 244–46 (2014) (analyzing
where discretion lies in the government regarding immigration decisions);
Antonia Castañeda, Language and other Lethal Weapons: Cultural Politics
and the Rites of Children as Translators of Culture, 19 Chicano-Latino
L. Rev. 229 (1998) (illustrating in story form the systemic use of children
as translators); Shabnam Javdani, Naomi Sadeh & Edelyn Verona,
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Proposed solutions have focused both on changing the
systems/institutions and on compensating or healing the individuals
and communities that have been harmed. 20 These are extremely
important and necessary works.
This article attempts to build on these works in three distinct
ways—first, by focusing on a particular type of identifiable system,
second by offering a new perspective on the problem of systemic
oppression, and third by offering a supplemental form of accountability
for oppressive systems.
“System,” for the purposes of this article, is a type of community.
It refers to an organization or group of organizations. An organization
is a community of individuals, and a system may be an organization or
a community of organizations. It has structure and leadership. It often
contains departments and factions. It communicates internally and
externally, has rules that govern behavior, and its own culture.
Organizational identity is an important factor in the law’s approach
to accountability for systems. In some cases, organizational identity is
viewed vertically. The identity of the organization rests largely in its
officers and top executives and their actions and decisions. This identity
follows Frederick Winslow Taylor’s theory of scientific management,
which allocated responsibility for thinking and planning to managers
while workers implemented these goals through their labor.21 As Max
Weber observed, the hierarchical and assembly-line structure of
classical organization theory had the effect of attempting to control
workers physically and emotionally for the sake of production.22
Another view of organizational identity is horizontal, following
theories of more democratized workplaces. “Social connection, inter–
action, and reciprocity lies at the heart of workplace social capital and
is reflected in trust between and among employees and management,
shared workplace values, norms of cooperation and reciprocity, esprit
Gendered Social Forces: A Review of the Impact of Institutionalized Factors
on Women and Girls’ Criminal Justice Trajectories, 17 Psych., Pub.
Pol’y & L. 161, 164–88 (2011) (detailing institutional factors leading
women and girls to criminally offend).
20.

See, e.g., Jennifer Honig & Susan Fendell, Meeting the Needs of Female
Trauma Survivors: The Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Mental Health
Managed Care System, 15 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 161, 168–72 (2000)
(comparing Massachusetts’ mental health managed care to other states);
Lupin Battersby, Lorraine Greaves & Rodney Hunt, Legal Redress and
Institutional Sexual Abuse: A Study of the Experiences of Deaf and Hard
of Hearing Survivors, 10 Fla. Coastal L. Rev. 67, 83–106 (2008)
(discussing redress process for Deaf survivors of residential school sexual
abuse).

21.

Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 Yale L.J. 2061, 2072–73
(2003).

22.

Id. at 2073.
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de corps, and what some organizational behavior theorists call
‘organizational citizenship behavior.’”23
A horizontal perception of organizational identity means that
responsibility and decisionmaking is spread more broadly throughout
the organization. More planning occurs at the unit level and infor–
mation may be more compartmentalized.
A system may also be a group of organizations that share a common
or related purpose. General Systems Theory suggests that it is possible
to identify certain propensities in one organization that will be
indicative of characteristics in other organizations. General Systems
Theory describes organizations that are embedded within each other
and connected and influenced by other systems.24 According to General
Systems Theory, the universe consists of nested systems and subsystems.25 As developed by Ludwig von Bertalanffy, General Systems
Theory hypothesizes common functionality among systems, such that
the mapping of the dynamics of one system may be useful in
understanding other systems.26 Obvious examples are the ways in which
some federal procedures and laws are echoed at the state level and then
how some of those processes replicate at local and neighborhood levels.
Scholars have also noted the working of complex systems in financial
markets 27 and family dynamics, 28 for example. According to
Bertalanffy:
There exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized
systems or their subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind,
the nature of their component elements, and the relation or
“forces” between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory,

23.

Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: Systems Design
and the New Workplace, 10 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 11, 22 (2005)
(footnote omitted).

24.

Joseph K Tan, Health Care, Information Systems in, in Encyclopedia of
Information Systems (2003) https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/
computer-science/general-system-theory (“The structure of a system may
involve a hierarchy of embedded subsystems, each having its own unified
purpose that contributes jointly to the functioning of the larger system.”).

25.

See Mary Dowell-Jones & Ross Buckley, Reconceiving Resilience: A New
Guiding Principle for Financial Regulation?, 37 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus.
1, 22 (2017) (describing systems theory from an economic market view–
point).

26.

See Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Passages from General System Theory,
https://www.panarchy.org/vonbertalanffy/systems.1968.html (last visited
June 21, 2021)

27.

Tan, supra note 24.

28.

Susan L. Brooks, Representing Children in Families, 6 Nev. L.J. 724,
724–26 (2006)(discussing family systems theory).
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not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal
principles applying to systems in general.29

General Systems Theory is a scientific theory of connectedness
suggesting that organizations exist within organizations and that at
each level common relationships, characteristics, and functions exist.30
General Systems Theory describes the probability that systems are
connected and related and that dealing effectively with one system may
inform the diagnosis and treatment of a problem in another system.31
Borrowing from General Systems Theory, Traumatized Systems
Theory suggests that groups of organizations may be traumatized as a
whole or may be affected by the trauma of one of its partners or
divisions. Understanding and remedying the trauma of one organization
in a group system may bring understanding and transformation for the
entire group and may inform addressing recurrent systemic harm in
other systems.
B.

Examples of Recurrent Systemic Harm

There are many examples of systems that repeatedly inflict harm.
The following are a few to set the stage and suggest the potential
variety of application for Traumatized Systems Theory:
1.

Corporate Risk-Taking

Some corporations and groups of corporations repeatedly engage in
risky behavior, such as investment strategies or reporting practices, that
are harmful to others and themselves. Scholars often focus on
corporations whose failure have the potential to have broad
consequences across the economy.32 These are organizations, like large
banks, that have been considered too big to fail because their failure
29.

von Bertalanffy, supra note 26.

30.

Tan, supra note 24 (“[General Systems Theory] begins with the empirical
observation that all ‘systems,’ regardless of their disciplinary domain,
share some important similarities in their underlying structure.”).

31.

Gregory Mitchell, Bertalanffy’s General Systems Theory, Mind
Development, https://mind-development.eu/systems.html [https://per
ma.cc/F3FC-5HU6] (last visited Feb. 28, 2021) (“The systems view looks
at the world in terms of relationships and integration.”).

32.

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public
Duty, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 4 (2016) (footnote omitted) (“[A] firm’s
failure would be externalized onto other market participants as well as onto
the public, including ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse.”);
John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder
Value, 6 J. Legal Analysis 35, 73 & n.62 (2014) (discussing the public
impact of corporate risk-taking); Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool:
Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 Minn. L. Rev.
761, 770 (2017) (same).
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would have catastrophic rippling effects on the economy. At the same
time, risky behavior on the part of smaller corporations can cause harm
to people involved at all levels, including shareholders, investors, and
consumers of corporate products. Corporate abuses are common, and
victims are often left with compensation equaling only a fraction of
their loss or no compensation at all.
2.

Systemic Racism

Systemic racism is the harm done by structures and institutions at
every level of society to preserve racial dominance and subordination.33
Racial scapegoating—blaming a particular group of people for a crisis
or danger—is one form of systemic racism that is repeatedly used to
manipulate power. Early uses of racial scapegoating involved vilifying
indigenous peoples in order to facilitate expansion for European
settlers. 34 Subsequently, at the federal level, racial scapegoating has
resulted in the internment of Japanese Americans,35 the demonization
of African American women as welfare queens, 36 the post-911
harassment of Muslim people as terrorists, 37 and the detention and
deportation of Latin American refugees as criminals.38
On the state level, recurrent racial scapegoating has manifested as
gerrymandering geographically identifiable populations because of their
effect on the allocation of political power.39 At the local level, recurrent

33.

Thomas Kleven, Systemic Classism, Systemic Racism: Are Social and
Racial Justice Achievable in the United States?, 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J.
37, 37 (2009) (defining systemic racism as “the political and economic
institutions of the society [that] are structured and operate to systematically
disadvantage . . . ethnic minorities”).

34.

Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 Duke L.J. 999, 1014–16
(2014) (explaining that Native Americans were portrayed as aggressors
whose violence justified stripping them of their land); David Wilkins, The
Manipulation of Indigenous Status: The Federal Government As ShapeShifter, 12 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 223, 226 (2001) (discussing treatment
of Native Americans as a “depraved race” and deliberate undermining of
societal structure and tribal sovereignty).

35.

See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–217 (1944).

36.

See Premilla Nadasen, From Widow to “Welfare Queen”: Welfare and the
Politics of Race, 2007 Black Women, Gender & Fams. 52, 53.

37.

See Hilal Elver, Racializing Islam Before and After 9/11: From Melting
Pot to Islamophobia, 21 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 119 (2012).

38.

See Rebecca Sharpless, “Immigrants are Not Criminals”: Respectability,
Immigration Reform and Hyperincarceration, 53 Hous. L. Rev. 691,
722–25 (2016).

39.

See Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 Harv.
L. Rev. 593, 596–97 (2002); see also Daniel P. Tokaji, Denying Systemic
Equality: The Last Words of the Kennedy Court, 13 Harv. L. & Pol’y
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racial scapegoating manifests as white flight from neighborhoods or to
private schools because Black families have integrated.40 This results in
school districts’ segregation then desegregation then re-segregation.
Racial scapegoating also manifested in the wars on crime and drugs,
and the resulting police brutality and mass incarceration.41 In private
industry, recurrent racial scapegoating may take the form of attacks on
affirmative action.42
3.

Artificial Intelligence

Some uses of artificial intelligence may provide examples of
recurrent systemic harm because the complex symmetry of data and
commands that make AI function constitute organizations nested
within each other—systems. Professors Mark Lemley and Bryan Cassey
point out that artificial intelligence systems acting on “poorly curated
data sets . . . run the risk of simply perpetuating existing biases by
continuing to favor historical haves against have-nots.”43 And recent
headlines told the story of a prominent AI ethics researcher who was
fired from Google while attempting to publish a paper concerning
learned bias in AI systems that analyze and generate language.44
For the most part, AI involves machine learning. So it is cognitive,
almost by definition. To the extent that AI learns bias, it is learning
some of the unconscious thoughts and patterns of its designers, trainers,
and data. However, a subsection of AI is evolving to include emotional
behavior. “Affective Computing” involves AI reading emotions:

Rev. 539, 540–41 (2019); Daniel P. Tokaji, Gerrymandering and
Association, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 2159, 2175 (2018).
40.

See Steven L. Nelson, Still Serving Two Masters? Evaluating the Conflict
Between School Choice and Desegregation Under the Lens of Critical
Race Theory, 26 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 43, 52–53 (2017); Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 628–630 (1983).

41.

See Hannah LF Cooper, War on Drugs Policing and Police Brutality, 50
Substance Use & Misuse 1188, 1188–89 (2015); see also Race and the
Drug War, Drug Pol’y All., https://drugpolicy.org/issues/race-anddrug-war [https://perma.cc/6BEE-G6SL] (last visited Feb. 21, 2021) (“The
drug war has produced profoundly unequal outcomes across racial groups,
manifested through racial discrimination by law enforcement and dispro–
portionate drug war misery suffered by communities of color.”).

42.

See, e.g., Fac., Alumni, & Students Opposed to Racial Preferences v. New
York Univ. L. Rev., No. 18–CV–9184 (ER), 2020 WL 1529311, at *1–2
(S.D.N.Y. 2020), appeal filed, No. 20–1508 (2nd Cir. May 7, 2020).

43.

Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1311, 1338 (2019).

44.

E.g., Behind the Paper that Led to a Google Researcher’s Firing, Wired
(Dec. 8, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/behind-paper-ledgoogle-researchers-firing/ [https://perma.cc/P9JB-6BLG].
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They can listen to voice inflections and start to recognize when
those inflections correlate with stress or anger. Machines can
analyze images and pick up subtleties in micro-expressions on
humans’ faces that might happen even too fast for a person to
recognize.45

Therefore, just as artificial intelligence may reflect the biases of its
designers, trainers, and data, it may also reflect their trauma. Because
artificial intelligence has society-wide dimensions through information
collection and dissemination and growing cultural dependence on digital
information, any trauma-responsive harms in AI have the potential to
exponentially expand harm.

II. Trauma and Trauma Response
Trauma is harm that, among other things, predictably produces
recurrent behavioral responses. Systems experience trauma and evince
trauma response in the form of recurrent harm to individuals,
communities, and themselves. This article is the first to apply the social
science concerning organizational trauma to formulate legal theory. The
social science of organizational trauma evolved from the science of
individual trauma and trauma response. Like individuals, organizations
may experience trauma by being victimized or by harming others. Also,
like individuals, traumatized organizations experience trauma symp–
toms or responses that are recurrent and difficult to control.
A.

Trauma

“Trauma” refers both to harm to the body and harm to the mind
and spirit. It is easy to understand how a blow to the body can affect
an individual. Broken bones and torn muscle may hamper mobility both
immediately after the trauma occurs and into the future. Sometimes,
the arthritis that results from the trauma does not manifest until much
later. A blow to the mind and spirit is similar to a blow to the body.
In fact, neuroscientists have discovered that psychological trauma
produces biological changes in the brain.46 “[T]rauma produces actual
physiological changes, including a recalibration of the brain’s alarm
system, an increase in stress hormone activity, and alterations in the

45.

Meredith Somers, Emotion AI, Explained, MIT Sloan Sch. Mgmt:
Ideas Made to Matter (Mar. 8, 2019), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideasmade-to-matter/emotion-ai-explained [https://perma.cc/VU9K-9TC5].

46.

Bessel van der Kolk, Prologue to The Body Keeps the Score:
Brain, Mind, and Body in the Healing of Trauma (2014).
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system that filters relevant information from irrelevant.”47 The effects
may manifest immediately or far into the future.48
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA) completed extensive collaborative work in formulating a
“concept of trauma” in individuals that could be shared among
constituencies of practitioners, researchers and survivors and used by
individuals and communities in receiving services and implementing
policy.49 “Individual trauma results from an event, series of events, or
set of circumstances that is experienced by an individual as physically
or emotionally harmful or life threatening and that has lasting adverse
effects on the individual’s functioning and mental, physical, social,
emotional, or spiritual well-being.”50
The SAMHSA definition entails the three “e”s of trauma—
1) events (and circumstances, happening once or repeatedly, that are
actual or threats of physical or psychological harm or neglect that
imperils development);51 2) experience of the event, which may vary
from person to person and “may be linked to a range of factors”;52 and
3) effects of the adverse experience, which may be short term or long
term and occur immediately or with some delay.53
Two of the best-known studies of trauma, the National Child
Trauma Stress Network (NCTSN) report54 and the Centers for Disease

47.

Id.

48.

See Vincent J. Felitti, Robert F. Anda, Dale Nordenberg, David F.
Williamson, Alison M. Spitz, Valerie Edwards, Mary P. Koss & James S.
Marks, Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to
Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 Am. J. Preventive Med. 245, 251 (1998)
(concluding that childhood adverse experiences may result in adult
morbidity); Kate Aschenbrenner, Ripples Against the Other Shore: The
Impact of Trauma Exposure on the Immigration Process Through
Adjudicators, 19 Mich. J. Race & L. 53, 60–63 (2013) (describing effects
of trauma).

49.

Substance Abuse & Mental Health Servs. Admin.’s Trauma &
Just. Strategic Initiative, SAMHSA’s Concept of Trauma and
Guidance for a Trauma-Informed Approach 7 (2014), http://store.
samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMA14-4884/SMA14-4884.pdf.

50.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

51.

Id. at 8.

52.

Id.

53.

Id.

54.

E. Jane Costello, Alaattin Erkanli, John A. Fairbank & Adrian Angold,
The Prevalence of Potentially Traumatic Events in Childhood and
Adolescence, 15 J. Traumatic Stress 99 (2002). See Child Traumatic
Stress: What Policy Makers Should Know, National Child Traumatic
Stress Network, https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources
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Control-Kaiser Permanente Adverse Childhood Experience (ACE)
Study,55 reveal its prevalence and impact. The NCTSN reported on a
North Carolina longitudinal general population study that found that
approximately 67% of children and adolescents had experienced a
potentially traumatic event by the age of 16.56 The ACE Study was
inspired when Dr. Vincent Felitti, who was the chief of Kaiser
Permanente’s Department of Preventive Medicine in San Diego,
California in the mid-1980s, accidently discovered a correlation between
obesity and childhood sexual abuse.57
Dr. Feletti’s focus had been obesity, and he was perplexed by the
high dropout rate from his obesity clinic of patients who were having
success in losing weight. 58 People who were 300 pounds overweight
would lose 100 pounds and then drop out of the program.59 Dr. Felitti
began interviewing patients in the clinic in order to uncover factors
contributing to obesity and the dropout rate:
The turning point in Felitti’s quest came by accident. The
physician was running through yet another series of questions
with yet another obesity program patient: How much did you
weigh when you were born? How much did you weigh when you
started first grade? How much did you weigh when you entered
high school? How old were you when you became sexually active?
How old were you when you married?
“I misspoke,” he recalls. “Instead of asking, ‘How old were you
when you were first sexually active?’ I asked, ‘How much did you
weigh when you were first sexually active?’ The patient, a woman,
answered, ‘Forty pounds.’”

/child_traumatic_stress_what_policymakers_should_know.pdf]
visited Feb. 28, 2021).

(last

55.

Felitti et al., supra note 48. See About the CDC-Kaiser ACE Study, Center
for Disease Control and Prevention (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.
cdc.gov/violenceprevention/aces/about.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3
A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fviolenceprevention%2Facestudy%2Fabout.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/X725-S2NQ].

56.

National Child Traumatic Stress Network, supra note 54 at 15;
William E. Copeland, Gordon Keeler, Adrian Angold & E. Jane Costello,
Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress in Childhood, 64 Archives
Gen. Psych. 577, 577, 580 (2007).

57.

Jane Ellen Stevens, Childhood Trauma: Root Causes of a Public Health
Crisis, 32 Del. Law. 10, 10–11 (2015) (discussing history of the ACE
study).

58.

Id. at 10.

59.

Id.
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He didn’t understand what he was hearing. He misspoke the
question again. She gave the same answer, burst into tears and
added, “It was when I was four years old, with my father.”60

Subsequent interviews with other patients revealed a pattern of
childhood sexual abuse and obesity.61
When Dr. Felitti partnered with epidemiologist Robert Anda at the
Center for Disease Control, further exploration expanded the types and
categories of adverse experiences considered. 62 The ACE Study was
“one of the largest investigations of childhood abuse and neglect and
household challenges and later-life health and well-being.”63 Through
the ACE Study, “[m]ore than 17,000 Health Maintenance Organization
(HMO) members undergoing a comprehensive physical examination
chose to provide detailed information about their childhood experience
of abuse, neglect, and family dysfunction.”64 The study considered seven
categories of adverse childhood experiences, divided into three types of
abuse (psychological abuse, physical abuse, sexual abuse) and four
categories of household dysfunction (violence against mother, living
with household member who is substance abuser, living with household
member who is mentally ill or suicidal, or living with a household
member who was ever imprisoned).65
The ACE study found that more than half of the study participants
had been exposed to one or more adverse experiences during
childhood,66 and more than one in five reported three or more such
experiences.67
60.

Id. at 11.

61.

Id.

62.

Karen Oehme, Anthony J. Ferraro, Nat Stern, Lisa S. Panisch & Mallory
Lucier-Greer, Trauma-Informed Co-Parenting: How a Shift in Compulsory
Divorce Education to Reflect New Brain Development Research Can
Promote Both Parents’ and Children’s Best Interests, 39 U. Haw. L. Rev.
37, 46–49 (2016).

63.

Center for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 55. See
also Stevens, supra note 57, at 10 (calling the ACE Study “the most
important public health study you never heard of”).

64.

Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs), Alaska Child.’s Tr., https://
www.alaskachildrenstrust.org/aces [https://perma.cc/X7GQ-63QT] (last
visited Feb. 19, 2021).

65.

Felitti et al., supra note 48, at 248.

66.

Id. at 249.

67.

About the CDC-Kaiser ACE Study: Data and Statistics, Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, https://www.cdc.gov/violence
prevention/acestudy/about.html [https://perma.cc/ABT6-9RUE] (last
updated Apr. 13, 2020) (presenting data on the prevalence of various
forms of trauma).
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B.

“Perpetrator” Trauma: Trauma to Those who Inflict Trauma

Another aspect of trauma that is less often discussed is the trauma
that comes from causing trauma to others. “This will hurt me more
than it hurts you” is a familiar adage attributed to parents who are
spanking their children. In the context of trauma, research indicates
that the concept is true:
[Trauma results from] being an active participant in causing harm
or trauma to others, whether in the line of duty or outside of the
law, such an in criminal activity. Psychologist Rachael MacNair’s
research suggests that traumatic effects of harming others,
intentionally or unintentionally, can be as severe as or more
severe than what victims and survivors experience.68

In other words, inflicting harm may produce equal or more trauma
response than being a victim of harm.
Saira Mohamed refers to this aspect of trauma as “perpetrator
trauma.” 69 She engages in the difficult and uncomfortable goal of
humanizing perpetrators of mass atrocities, arguing that they are
human and not monsters. Her central focus is “the idea
that perpetrators can experience their crimes as trauma—that is, that
commission of the crime itself causes a psychological injury to the
perpetrator, which can result in particular adverse physical, social, or
emotional consequences.”70 The concept of perpetrator trauma blurs the
line between perpetrator and victim in another manner. As the
discussion that follows indicates, victims of trauma are particularly
prone to violent and aggressive behavior either against others or
themselves, and the idea of perpetrator trauma raises the prospect that
inflicting trauma may be trauma responsive behavior manifesting as
self-harm through harm to others.
Whether as victim or perpetrator, research shows that trauma is
pervasive and global, and has serious life-long implications for health
and behavior.
C.

Trauma Response

Trauma predictably produces trauma symptoms and responses.
Just like the presence of a physical illness or injury may be diagnosed
through the existence of certain known and predictable symptoms,
68.

Carolyn Yoder, The Little Book of Trauma Healing: When
Violence Strikes and Community Security is Threatened 14 (2005)
(citing Rachael MacNair, Perpetration-Induced Traumatic Stress:
The Psychological Consequences of Killing (2002)).

69.

Saira Mohamed, Of Monsters and Men: Perpetrator Trauma and Mass
Atrocity, 115 Colum. L. Rev. 1157, 1162–64 (2015).

70.

Id. at 1162.
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psychological injury produces known and predictable responses.71 The
ACE study, for example, was inspired by Dr. Felitti’s observation of
common behavior among patients in the obesity clinic, dropping out
after a period of success. 72 In addition, common symptoms among
veterans returning home was the catalyst for a resurgence of interest in
psychological trauma following the Vietnam War.73
When trauma involves abuse, neglect, interpersonal dysfunction, or
loss, for example, common responses include difficulty in regulating
physical and emotional functions, difficulty in regulating attention and
behavioral functions, and difficulty in stabilizing identity and
relationship functions.74 Physical and emotional symptoms may include
tantrums or immobilization due to difficulty tolerating and recovering
from feelings of fear, anger, or shame; difficulty with eating, sleeping,
or elimination; over or under reactivity to sound or touch; and
numbness. 75 Attention and behavioral difficulty may mean pre–
occupation with threat or difficulty judging safety and danger cues;
impaired capacity for self-protection and extreme risk taking;
maladaptive self-soothing; self-harm; and difficulty sustaining goaldirected behavior.76 “Most studies find significantly increased rates of
internalizing disorders (especially major depression-dysthymia and
suicidal ideation) and externalizing disorders (oppositional defiant
behaviors, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, self-destructive
behaviors) in maltreated children and adolescents.”77 Self and relational
difficulty may mean “intense preoccupation with the safety of the
caregiver or other loved ones;” low self-esteem and self-loathing;
71.

See Bradley C. Stolbach, Reese Minshew, Vikki Rompala, Renee Z.
Dominguez, Tanja Gazibara & Robert Finke, Complex Trauma Exposure
and Symptoms in Urban Traumatized Children: A Preliminary Test of
Proposed Criteria for Developmental Trauma Disorder, 26 J. Traumatic
Stress 483, 483 (2013) (“Clinicians and researchers have suggested that
ongoing trauma, coupled with compromised caregiving, may result in a
distinct constellation of symptoms.”).

72.

See supra notes 57–61 and accompanying text.

73.

Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, American Psychiatric Association
(2013), https://www.aging.pa.gov/publications/policy-procedure-manual/
Documents/PTSD%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/468J-TYGQ].
Both the DSM-IV and DSM-V list characteristic symptoms of trauma. Id.

74.

Stolbach et al., supra note 71, at 484.

75.

See id. app. at 488–89.

76.

Id. at 489.

77.

Michael D. De Bellis, Developmental Traumatology: The Psychobiological
Development of Maltreated Children and its Implications for Research,
Treatment, and Policy, 13 Dev. and Psychopathology 539, 544 (2001)
(citing Nat’l Rsch Council, Understand Child Abuse and Neglect
(1993)).
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distrust, defiance or lack of reciprocal behavior in relationships; physical
or verbal aggression; inappropriate attempts for intimate contact; or
either a lack of empathy or excessive responsiveness to the distress of
others.78
Although symptomology is particularly pronounced when the
trauma occurs during childhood, adults who experience trauma also
exhibit trauma response.79 In The Body Keeps the Score: Brain, Mind
and Body in the Healing of Trauma, Dr. Bessel van der Kolk, former
director of the Trauma Center and a leader in trauma research and
practice, discusses the trauma of soldiers returning home from war:
Soldiers returning home from combat may frighten their families
with their rages and emotional absence. The wives of men who
suffer from PTSD tend to become depressed, and the children of
depressed mothers are at risk of growing up insecure and anxious.
Having been exposed to family violence as a child often makes it
difficult to establish stable, trusting relationships as an adult.80

Dr. van der Kolk’s description of secondary trauma illustrates how
predictable responses to trauma by adults may produce trauma in other
adults and in children, which produces a cycle of trauma. His
description highlights that while there are cultural and individual
distinctions in trauma response, to a significant degree, the
symptomology of trauma response is predictable and common.
D.

Non-cognitive Trauma Response

Trauma response is non-cognitive. Neuroscience has revealed that
trauma may alter the functioning of the “emotional brain,” which is
composed of the brain stem (also known as the reptilian brain) and the
limbic system (also known as the mammalian brain). 81 The limbic
system regulates fear, rage, male sexual behavior, addiction,
motivation, and memory.82
The emotional brain is non-cognitive; it develops before the
cognitive part of the brain and controls the basic functions that a person
78.

Stolbach et al., supra note 71, app. at 489.

79.

See van der Kolk, supra note 46, at 7–11 (discussing trauma in war
veterans).

80.

Prologue to id.

81.

Id. at 56, 61; see also Charles A. Nelson, III, The Effects of Early Life
Adversity on Brain and Behavioral Development, Dana Foundation
(Oct. 22, 2012), https://dana.org/article/the-effects-of-early-life-adver
sity-on-brain-and-behavioral-development/ [https://perma.cc/7EC2-MG
CX].

82.

V. RajMohan & E. Mohandas, The Limbic System, 49 Indian J. Psych.
132, 135–37 (2007).
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has when she is born, like crying, eating, sleeping, and expelling bodily
toxins, as well as the emotions.83 The emotional brain is responsible for
trauma response and acts automatically, using “preprogrammed escape
plans, like the fight-or-flight responses. These muscular and physio–
logical reactions are automatic, set in motion without any thought or
planning on our part, leaving our conscious, rational capacities to catch
up later.”84
Trauma response, then, is not an aspect of how someone thinks,
whether consciously or unconsciously. Trauma response is not
cognition. Instead, it is often a reflexive or instinctual reaction to fear
or threat.
E.

Repetition and Control: Spotlight on Trauma Symptoms

Two symptoms of trauma are both particularly troubling and
particularly relevant to Traumatized Systems Theory—symptom
repetition and limited controllability.
1.

Symptoms Repetition: Recurrence and Relationship

Trauma is an event of such magnitude that it etches into the
physical, emotional, and spiritual memory of the individual or
community. Responses to trauma often create a loop in time, when an
event from the past is recorded in the unconscious fight-or-flight
processes of an individual or community and relived in the present in
new relationships. This traumatic imprinting produces a compulsive
response to repair or alter the original trauma-inflicting interaction or
relationship.85 As a result, trauma response often involves repetition of
the trauma.86 Survivors of trauma often re-experience the trauma over
and over, either as victim or perpetrator.87 As a result, violence, selfdestructive behaviors, and re-victimization are often unconscious
manifestations of trauma re-enactment.88 One of the most important
goals of some trauma-related policy is preventing re-victimization, “the

83.

Id. at 135; van der Kolk, supra note 46, at 55–56.

84.

van der Kolk, supra note 46, at 57.

85.

Bessel A. van der Kolk, The Compulsion to Repeat the Trauma: Reenactment, Revictimization, and Masochism, 12 Psychiatric Clinics N.
Am. 389, 389 (1989).

86.

Id.

87.

See id. at 390 (“In behavioral re-enactment of the trauma, the self may play
the role of either victim or victimizer.”); Lauren E. Gibson, Erin’s Law:
Preventing Child Sexual Abuse through Education, 44 J.L. & Educ. 263,
267–68 (2015).

88.

van der Kolk, supra note 85, at 390–91.
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likelihood of [trauma] victims becoming victims of [trauma] again later
in life and exhibiting risky . . . behavior as they grow older.”89
Trauma symptomology that manifests in recurrent traumatic
events has been described as “repetition compulsion” 90 : “[m]any
traumatized people expose themselves, seemingly compulsively, to
situations reminiscent of the original trauma. These behavioral
reenactments are rarely consciously understood to be related to earlier
life experiences.”91 Although children are more prone to this response,
adults who experience trauma also evince repetition.92 Freud theorized
that the function of the repetition was to produce mastery of the
experience.93 In that sense, the repetition compulsion response is about
relationship, an unconscious compulsion to gain control of the outcome
in the initial traumatic interaction or relationship by re-living it. 94
Instead, of repairing or altering the ruptured past relationship,
repetition often produced additional cycles of trauma for the survivor
in contemporary relationships.95
2.

Trauma Response is not Easily Controlled

As repetition and recurrence suggest, trauma response is not easily
controlled. That does not mean that trauma is impossible to control or
heal. However, trauma survivors are often not even aware that their
actions are trauma responsive.96 Because trauma response occurs in the
parts of the brain outside of the prefrontal cortex, it is not easily
regulated by cognitive functions that inhibit inappropriate action or
moderate empathy and understanding.97 The difficulty comes not only
in healing traumatic harm, but also in controlling the symptoms of and
responses to the trauma.98 For individual trauma survivors whose initial
experience of trauma involved some loss of power or control, the
89.

Gibson, supra note 87, at 268.

90.

van der Kolk, supra note 85, at 390–91.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id. at 389.

95.

Id.

96.

van der Kolk, supra note 46, at 45 (reasoning that the trauma survivors
“may not be aware that they are reexperiencing and reenacting the past”).

97.

See Tian Dayton, Emotional Sobriety: From Relationship Trauma
to Resilience and Balance, at xvii (2007); van der Kolk, supra note
46, at 62–63.

98.

Debra Niehoff, Invisible Scars: The Neurobiological Consequences of Child
Abuse, 56 DePaul L. Rev. 847, 875 (2007) (discussing the difficulty of
eradicating traumatic response).
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assertion of control in the present, in an effort to regulate trauma
response, may have the effect of triggering and re-victimizing.99
The goal of noting that trauma response is not easily controlled is
not to enter the longstanding debate about whether trauma survivors
who inflict trauma are morally culpable for the harm that they cause.100
Although scholars have debated whether trauma-responsive action is a
choice101 and whether triggered actors should be held responsible for
their actions,102 Traumatized Systems Theory assumes that those who
inflict harm are and should be accountable for their actions, whether as
individuals or systems. Accountability can take many forms, however,
and may involve accountability to make efforts to heal in order to avoid
harming in the future. In addition, as a practical matter, the most
effective policy may involve something in addition to cognitively
oriented control.103
Linda Fentiman, for example, has examined the use of criminal law
to attempt to control drug use among pregnant women.104 She observes
that environmental factors, such as trauma, contribute to drug use,105
and that efforts to control drug use through criminal deterrence have
been counterproductive.106 Although she suggests that addiction is a
99.

See Jennifer Honig & Susan Fendell, Meeting the Needs of Female Trauma
Survivors: The Effectiveness of the Massachusetts Mental Health Managed
Care System, 15 Berkeley Women’s L.J. 161, 173–77 (2000) (discussing
past and present loss of control).

100. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Innocence and The Sopranos, 49 N.Y. L. Sch.
L. Rev. 577, 578–99 (2004) (questioning Supreme Court’s “innocence”
jurisprudence, comparing trauma responsive non-innocent actors to
survivors and bystanders).
101. Id. at 615 (arguing that childhood trauma does not mean that one does
not choose wrongdoing or is innocent). See Francis X. Shen,
Neurolegislation: How U.S. Legislators are Using Brain Science, 29 Harv.
J. L. & Tech. 495, 496 (2016) (noting that neuroscience has raised debate
about whether people have free will and its implications for law).
102. See Linda C. Fentiman, Rethinking Addiction: Drugs, Deterrence, and the
Neuroscience Revolution, 14 U. Pa. J. L. & Soc. Change 233, 235 (2011)
(“Rivers of ink have been spilled and acres of forests have been destroyed
discussing whether our expanded understanding of the biological and
environmental factors that shape human decision-making demands a change
in the laws of criminal responsibility.”).
103. See Honig & Fendell, supra note 99, at 173–77 (discussing ineffectiveness
of coercive control on trauma survivors); see also Richard H. Thaler
& Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health,
Wealth, and Happiness (2008) (suggesting “choice architecture” to
affect automated cognitive decision making).
104. Fentiman, supra note 102, at 233, 235, 260–61.
105. Id. at 246.
106. Id. at 237–41.
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choice,107 the success from using incentives, as opposed to punishment,
to address drug addiction may be attributed to neuroplasticity and the
capacity of the brain to reprogram with positive reinforcement rather
than control.108
The limited effectiveness of control on trauma response also has
implications for organizational and systemic survivors. Even though
organizations affected by trauma do not have an emotional brain that
is affected by trauma through biological reactions, trauma response in
organizations is similarly difficult to control. Neuroscience suggests that
the biological aspects of trauma may have social or communal effect.
For example, mirror neurons in the frontal lobes hold the “ability to
‘feel into’ someone else.” 109 Mirror neurons facilitate empathy,
imitation, and synchrony, which enable individuals to pick up on the
emotional state and intentions of others, including trauma-influenced
states.110 Therefore, the difficulty of controlling trauma in individuals
may translate into similar difficulty in organizational communities.
However, just as memories imprinted by trauma in individuals may be
healed through the neuroplasticity of the brain, collective traumatic
memories in organizations probably can also be healed by retraining
emotional reflexes, in addition to attempting to reign them in.

III. Traumatized Systems: Triggered Systems
Traumatized systems are organizations or groups of organizations
that have experience trauma and exhibit trauma response—triggered
systems. Triggered systems mimic triggered individuals in many ways:
they are often aggressive; their actions are often unaligned with and
disproportionate to the present circumstances; and the harmful actions,
policies, and practices that triggered systems inflict do not resolve the
systems’ originating traumas and situations. Instead, they often cause
additional harm to the system and to others.
An organization or group of organizations is a type of community.
Trauma affects communities, as well as individuals. “[S]ometimes the
tissues of community can be damaged in much the same way as the
tissues of mind and body.” 111 Communities experience trauma when
some overwhelming event affects the community as a whole.
107. Id. at 246–47.
108. Id. at 247–49.
109. van der Kolk, supra note 46, at 58.
110. Id. at 58–59.
111. Michal Alberstein, ADR and Collective Trauma: Constructing the Forum
for the Traumatic Fuss, 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 11, 17 (2008)
(quoting 1 Kai Erikson, A New Species of Trouble: Explorations
in Disaster, Trauma, and Community 230 (1994)); see also Joel B.
Eisen, The Trajectory of “Normal” after 9/11: Trauma, Recovery and Post-
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Some scholars have suggested community trauma is a form of
collective memory.112 Jody Lyneé Madeira describes collective memory
as the process of individuals sharing life events and memories and
interpretations of those events.113 The communal effort of processing the
events shapes and reshapes perceptions of what has occurred. 114
Collective memory also plays a part in forming and reforming identity
for groups and individuals. “Groups may therefore perform memory
work by constructing areas of common knowledge which create social
bonds between members.” 115 Some aspects of identity, then, are
communal creations, products of collective understanding.
Cultural trauma is a specific type of collective memory.116 “Cultural
trauma occurs ‘when members of a collectivity feel they have been
subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks on their
group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their
future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways.’”117 In some ways,
then, community trauma plays a part in defining the community, as
knowledge, memory, understanding, and relationships within the
community emerge in response to trauma.
Madeira uses the Oklahoma City bombing as a case study of
community trauma while making references to the bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the Holocaust.118 In addition to the harm
done to the specific victims of the bombing, individual members of the
Traumatic Societal Adaptation, 14 Fordham Env’t. L.J. 499, 528–53
(2003) (discussing communal response to trauma and a model for posttraumatic societal adaptation). See generally David Dante Troutt, Trapped
in Tragedies: Childhood Trauma, Spatial Inequality, and Law, 101 Marq.
L. Rev. 601 (2018) (discussing the connection between complex childhood
trauma and spatial inequality).
112. See Jan Assmann, Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, New German
Critique, no. 65, Spring–Summer 1995, at 125–133 (discussing Maurice
Halbwachs’ shift of earlier views of collective memory as biological to
cultural).
113. Jody Lyneé Madeira, When It’s So Hard to Relate: Can Legal Systems
Mitigate the Trauma of Victim-Offender Relationships?, 46 Hous. L.
Rev. 401, 418–19 (2009).
114. Id. at 418–24.
115. Id. at 419 (citing Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory 52
(Lewis A. Coser trans., 1992)).
116. Id. at 420.
117. Id. at 421 (quoting Jefferey C. Alexander, The Meanings of Social
Life: A Cultural Sociology 85 (2003)).
118. Id. at 419–20. On April 19, 1995, thousands of pounds of fuel oil and fertilizer
were used to bomb the nine-story Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City. 162 people were killed, including 19 children, and nearly 700
more were injured. Id. at 403.
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victims’ families formed networks to gather and exchange information,
find solace, and offer support.119 “In essence, memory offers a form and
content for addressing the Oklahoma City bombing in that it both
structures and explains the evolving understandings of the bombing and
its perpetrators formed by individuals and groups.”120 Trauma, then,
can be a communal experience with collective memories and
collaborative understanding.
Organizations have been identified by social science as a particular
type of community that experiences trauma. “Organisational trauma
[i]s a set of responses to one or more events that reach beyond the
organisation’s ability to handle the situation adaptively, which
culminates to dysfunctional patterns of behaviour.” 121 Trauma can
manifest in the organization as a whole or in particular units of the
organization, as well as in the individual members of the organization.122
Organizational trauma response is not a cognitive phenomenon
involving thinking processes and errors. Instead, like individual trauma,
organizational trauma response is an instinctive reaction. 123 Organ–
izational trauma symptoms manifest in a variety of dysfunctional
behaviors, 124 internally and externally, similar to individual trauma
response. Hostility and abusive or manipulative behavior toward
individuals or other organizations or communities may be some of the
external symptoms of organizational trauma. 125 Internally, trauma
119. Id. at 419.
120. Id.
121. Stanislav Hasa & Richard Brunet-Thornton, Impact of
Organizational Trauma on Workplace Behavior and Perfor–
mance, at xix (2017) (citation omitted).
122. William A. Kahn, The Revelation of Organizational Trauma, 39 J.
Applied Behav. Sci. 364, 366 (2003).
123. Hasa & Brunet-Thornton, supra note 121, at xvii (“When confronted
with a stressful event that surpasses the ability to cope, this experience may
lead to trauma. This condition, an emotional response that jeopardizes psy–
chological integrity, produces a series of symptoms that includes flashbacks,
strained relationships, and physical manifestations. If such an event affects
a significant portion of a group as in the case of an ethnic cluster or a nation,
it disrupts the social structure and the sense of community. Incidental
reports in the literature suggest that formally established institutions,
organisations, and businesses are not immune from suffering symptoms of
collective trauma.”)
124. Id. (“The organization develops symptoms disconnected from the trauma
itself.”).
125. Kahn, supra note 122, at 367 (citation omitted) (“[Symptoms] act as social
defenses against the anxiety and the pain that the originating trauma
triggers in the unconscious life of the organization. Like individual defenses
against trauma, these social defenses assume lives of their own. Like
individual defenses, they call attention to rather than suppress trauma.”).

1010

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
Traumatized Systems Theory

symptoms in organizations may mean poor performance or production,
institutional conflict, dysfunctional, risky, or self-destructive decision–
making, and low employee morale.
Like individual trauma response, trauma responsive behavior in
organizations is recurrent:
[C]ollective trauma disrupts and alters the structure of social
bonds of a community or a group of people. An important
conclusion relative to collective trauma is that the traumatic
events does not only affect the direct participants, but is transgenerational. More specifically, the next generation that has not
personally experienced the incident may replicate the
maladaptive behaviour patterns of the direct victims.126

In other words, not only may an organization experience the
compulsion to repeat trauma, but organizations may repeat trauma
symptoms because subsequent generations of employees experience the
trauma through the transgenerational collective memory of the
organization.
Trauma response in organizations is difficult to control. “When
affected by events with a strong adverse impact, an organization, all or
part, may exhibit signs of collective traumatization that in turn,
deteriorates social bonds, damages external relations, and possibly
instigate secondary and transgenerational traumatisation.” 127 As a
result, remedies for traumatized systems must take into account the
recurrent and difficult-to-control motivations of their behavior.
Unlike many other communities, traumatized systems are often
situated in positions of financial, social, or political power, which means
that their actions affect many individuals or communities. The effect
that traumatized systems have on individuals and communities may be
particularly severe because of the type of relationships that traumatized
systems often have with individuals and communities. Some
psychological research has revealed that interpersonal trauma, or
trauma at the hands of a caregiver, has the effect of impairing or
suppressing memory of the trauma more than other types of trauma.128
This type of trauma, sometimes referred to as “betrayal trauma,”129
often produces more pronounced trauma symptoms in the survivors,
such as “poorer physical health, anxiety, depression, dissociation,
borderline personality disorder characteristics, shame, hallucinations,
126. Hasa & Brunet-Thornton, supra note 121, at xviii–xix (citation
omitted).
127. Id. at xvii.
128. Carly P. Smith, Jennifer M. Gómez & Jennifer J. Freyd, The Psychology
of Judicial Betrayal, 19 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 451, 454–55 (2014).
129. Id.
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self-harm, and re-victimization,” because the trauma was perpetrated
by someone upon whom the survivor depended or trusted.130
This research indicates that betrayal trauma also occurs when
institutions that survivors trust or depend upon perpetrate trauma.131
According to betrayal trauma theory, when institutions, like the judicial
system, for example, or law enforcement, educational systems, religious
organizations, or organizations having a particular relationship with the
survivor, inflict trauma through omission or commission, the
consequences for the survivor are similarly severe to interpersonal
trauma.132
Not all organizations and systems are trauma driven. Many or
perhaps most organizations and systems have positive impacts on
individuals and communities. Even organizations that cause harm may
not be responding to trauma. Instead, their behavior may be an efficient
choice, or it may be influenced by unconscious error or bias. Neutral
systems are organizations and groups of organizations that affect
individuals and communities, but are not driven by their own trauma
response.
When harm is recurrent and irrational, however, it suggests
something other than neutral systemic action. There are many
examples of recurrent systemic harm that seem to involve something
other than rational decisionmaking, including law enforcement’s use of
children as informants in the “war on drugs;” 133 “strip searching
children who are allegedly victims of abuse and neglect in a nonmedical
setting;”134 visitation orders for parents who are incarcerated for acts of
violence against another parent; 135 legal and social practices that
130. Id. (footnotes omitted).
131. Id. at 459.
132. See id. at 459–60.
133. Andrea L. Dennis, Collateral Damage? Juvenile Snitches in America’s
“Wars” on Drugs, Crime, and Gangs, 46 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1145, 1149
(2009). See also Alexandra Emily Bochte, The Double-Edged Sword of
Justice: The Need for Prosecutors to Take Care of Child Victims, 35
Child.’s Legal Rts. J. 200, 202 (2015) (noting the traumatizing effects of
testifying on child witness); Sarah Kroll, Opposing Viewpoints: The Sixth
Amendment and Child Witnesses, 35 Child.’s Legal Rts. J. 257, 257–58
(2015) (same).
134. Autumn R. Ascano & Joseph A. Meader, Juridogenic Harm and Adverse
Childhood Experiences, 62 S.D. L. Rev. 797, 801 (2017).
135. Dana Harrington Conner, Do No Harm: An Analysis of the Legal and Social
Consequences of Child Visitation Determinations for Incarcerated
Perpetrators of Extreme Acts of Violence against Women, 17 Colum. J.
Gender & L. 163, 229 (2008); see also Rosie Gonzalez & Janice Corbin,
The Cycle of Violence: Domestic Violence and its Effects on Children, 13
SCHOLAR 405, 428–29 (2010) (discussing healthcare professionals, police,
and courts’ effect of perpetuating domestic violence).
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exacerbate health disparities;136 separation of immigrant parents and
children;137 and the treatment of native people.138
Traumatized systems often manifest common characteristics—
trauma history, recurrently harmful behavior, and unresponsiveness to
efforts to control harmful outcomes. Trauma history for organizations
and systems may come in a variety of different forms. Organizations
and groups of organizations may experience victimization through
chronic underfunding, hostile business practices of other organizations,
natural disasters like COVID-19 or a hurricane, or broader systemic
factors like an economic depression. On the other hand, systems and
organizations may have a history of trauma due to their own harmful
actions. Perpetrator trauma also manifests in systems.139 Organizations
whose purpose includes punishing individuals or separating families
have a high risk of trauma.
Recurrently harmful behavior refers to behavior that is repeated
and is not rational, rather defensive or reflexive, resembling fight or
flight. Recurrent harm often manifests in policies and practices that
harm individuals and communities. Police shootings of unarmed Black
and Latinx people, chronically inadequate education, and repeatedly
directing environmental hazards into Black and Latinx communities are
examples of recurrent systemic harm.
Unresponsiveness to control-based remedies means that efforts to
prevent future harms through judicial precedent, regulation, legislation,
media pressure, boycott, or some other method of control are
unsuccessful over time. Sometimes, the harm does not subside. At other
times, while efforts to control the harm may produce beneficial
outcomes for a generation or two, ultimately, the harm returns.

136. Emily A. Benfer, Health Justice: A Framework (and Call to Action) for
the Elimination of Health Inequity and Social Injustice, 65 Am. U. L.
Rev. 275, 299–300 (2015).
137. Madison Burga & Angelina Lerma, The Use of Prosecutorial Discretion in
the Immigration Context after the 2013 ICE Directive: Families are Still
Being Torn Apart, 42 W. State L. Rev. 25, 52–53 (2014) (prosecutorial
discretion trauma impact on immigrant children).
138. Andrea A. Curcio, Civil Claims for Uncivilized Acts: Filing Suit Against
the Government for American Indian Boarding Schools Abuses, 4 Hastings
Race & Poverty L.J. 45, 72–76 (2006) (intergenerational effects of
boarding schools); Patrice H. Kunesh, A Call for an Assessment of the
Welfare of Indian Children in South Dakota, 52 S.D. L. Rev. 247, 256–57
(2007) (intergenerational effects of government policies); Catherine A.
O’Neill, Environmental Justice in the Tribal Context: A Madness to EPA’s
Method, 38 Env’t. L. 495, 498 (2008) (effect of EPA’s mercury rule); Sarah
Deer, Relocation Revisited: Sex Trafficking of Native Women in the United
States, 36 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 621, 674–82 (2010) (colonial links and
law and policy facilitating sex trafficking of Native women).
139. See Mohamed, supra note 69, at 1188–89.
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This article adds a lens to consider the implications of oppressive
systems as trauma survivors. The aim is not to distract attention away
from individuals and communities that have been harmed by these
systems; rather, the aim is to suggest that ending many persistent
societal problems affecting individuals and communities may require an
additional perspective.

IV. Traumatized Systems Theory
This article introduces a new legal theory—Traumatized Systems
Theory. Traumatized Systems Theory posits that a primary function of
law is to mediate relationships—relationships among individuals,
organizations, groups of organizations, communities, states, nations,
groups of nations, and species. Traumatized Systems Theory observes
that these relationships are affected not only by the trauma-responsive
behavior of individuals, but also by the trauma-responsive behavior of
systems. Traumatized systems are organizations or groups of
organizations whose behavior is motivated to some degree by their
response to organizational trauma.
Traumatized Systems Theory lies at the intersection of social
science concerning organizational trauma, general systems theory, and
law. And it stands on the shoulders of legal theories that critique the
neutrality of law—critical legal studies, legal realism, critical race
theory, feminist theory, Latcrit, and queer legal theory. Traumatized
Systems Theory hypothesizes that in addition to other factors that may
affect behavior and relationships, at a systemic level, such as cost and
efficiency, white supremacy, patriarchy, and hetero-binary centrism,
trauma response also affects behavior. In fact, some aspects of white
supremacy, patriarchy, and hetero-binary centrism may be trauma
responsive.
Traumatized Systems Theory argues that many efforts to address
recurrent systemic harm have failed because existing legal theories and
remedies do not account for the trauma-responsive nature of the
behavior. The compulsion to repeat is significant for the legal theory of
traumatized systems because of its implications for behavior and
relationship. Traumatic recurrence means that the relationships at
which law is directed may be multidimensional, occurring simul–
taneously in the present and some relived, traumatic past. Legal
theories that attempt to predict laws’ effect on behavior and
relationship are incomplete to the extent that they overlook the
significance of trauma.
*TRIGGER WARNING*
For example, to the extent that traumatized systems contribute to
the abuse of children, by omission or commission, they have a
relationship with the individuals involved in the abuse and individuals
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subsequently harmed by them. Research and empirical data indicate
that individuals who commit crimes “have often been physically or
sexually abused as children . . . . Self-destructive acts are common in
abused children.”140 Girls who were abused are more likely to be abused
as adults, and children who are sexually abused have a higher risk of
engaging in criminal activity or becoming prostitutes.141 Dr. van der
Kolk cites a study by Diana Russell that found a link between childhood
incest and future victimization. 142 Although incest survivors were
seldom conscious of the trauma response, “[v]ictims of father-daughter
incest were four times more likely than nonincest victims to be asked
to pose for pornography,” and were also at higher risk for other forms
of abuse and drug use.143
Blaming the victim is not an appropriate response to repetition
compulsion, however. Repetition compulsion in individuals may be a
source of many deeply misguided suppositions that blame individual
survivors for harm done to them or assert a simplistic analysis of
consent by individual survivors. Repetition compulsion in individuals is
an infection from a traumatic wound. To attribute the consequences of
that infection to the wounded individual rather than the system that
caused or exploits the injury is a frequent error, identified in this article
as “inverse accountability.” Instead, accountability for the
consequences of trauma should fall primarily on the systems that inflict
traumatic wounds that fester into cycles of trauma response in
individuals.
Repetition compulsion also affects systems and their behavior.
Repetition and recurrence mean that systems that are trauma-affected,
either through victimization or by victimizing, 144 may respond
repeatedly to their own trauma, inflicting harm on individuals and
communities over and over. Law and policy aimed at addressing
recurrent harm must not only address the relationships in the present
but should also take into account trauma-originating relationships of
the past.
Trauma in systems may help to explain why some systems create
policies that are harmful by design or do not even approach solving
140. van der Kolk, supra note 85, at 390–91 (citing A.N. Groth, Sexual Trauma
in the Life Histories of Rapists and Child Molestors, 4 Victimology 6
(1979); Theoharis K. Seghorn, Robert A. Prentky & Richard J. Boucher,
Childhood Sexual Abuse in the Lives of Sexually Aggressive Offenders, 26
J. Am. Acad. Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 262 (1987)).
141. Id. at 390–93.
142. Id. at 391 (citing Diana E. H. Russell, The Secret Trauma: Incest
in the Lives of Girls and Women (1986)).
143. Id.
144. See discussion of perpetrator trauma, supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
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some of the social problems that they purport to address. 145 It
acknowledges that some organizations and institutions use their rules
and practices as acts of aggression against individuals and communities.
Some of these behaviors are clearly conscious, intentional, and
calculated. Other behaviors may be unconscious and recurrent efforts
of systems to resolve past trauma. These efforts fail, only succeeding in
victimizing others and re-victimizing the system itself.
Despite efforts to regulate BP, the company continued to engage in
unsafe practices and continued inflicting devastating harm on
individuals and communities. 146 If BP was triggered, it provides a
helpful illustration of some of the problems that Traumatized Systems
Theory seeks to address. First, the BP disasters illustrates that there
are gaps in effective systems accountability. Second, it illustrates the
insufficiency of control as a methodology. Third, it illustrates the
fundamental unfairness of inverse accountability.
A.

Accountability Gaps

The gap that Traumatized Systems Theory seeks to address is the
failure of law and policy to attempt to remedy systemic trauma in
addition to attempting to control its symptoms. Accountability that
supplements existing remedies may take many forms, including
responsibility to identify trauma response, acknowledge the trauma to
those affected, and heal the trauma within the system in order to stop
recurrent, harmful trauma response. Courts routinely consider
organizational thinking, either conscious or unconscious, when making
determinations about accountability and liability.147 Courts have also
recognized that corporations experience trauma. For example, under
Delaware law shareholders in a derivative suit may be excused from the
procedural step of first demanding action from the board if they plead
a sufficient connection between the board and the “corporate trauma”
to indicate bad faith on the part of a majority of the board in
monitoring corporate action. 148 Situations described as corporate
trauma include mine closure due to repeated worker injury and death;149
hackers stealing the “confidential data of over 33,000 federal employees,

145. See also Mark Sidel, Richard B. Lillich Memorial Lecture: New Directions
in the Struggle Against Human Trafficking, 17 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y
187, 202–04 (2008) (describing policies that condemn but do not actually
enforce punishment or prevention of human trafficking).
146. See discussion of BP disasters, supra notes 1–12.
147. See discussion of the organizational mind, infra Part V.
148. South v. Baker, 62 A.3d 1, 14 (Del. Ch. 2012); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
149. In re Hecla Mining Co. Derivative S’holder Litig., No. 2:12-CV-000119MHW, 2014 WL 689036, at *8 (D. Idaho Feb. 20, 2014).
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potential employees, and contractors;” 150 and Cambridge Analytica
impermissibly gathering and analyzing “data from millions of Facebook
users in order to influence U.S. elections.”151
Although courts and policymakers acknowledge the fact of
organizational trauma, the implications of that trauma are not
accounted for in law and policy. And even though trauma predictably
produces trauma response, systems and organizations are not described
as having acted in trauma responsive ways and remedies are not crafted
to address systemic trauma. Even if an organization experiences trauma
through victimization (rather than being a perpetrator), through
natural disaster or hostile corporate attack, for example, the
organization must be held accountable for the underlying trauma once
it begins to produce harmful symptoms.
The vast majority of remedies only address symptoms—damages to
compensate victims, regulatory adherence, monitoring, and fines to
attempt to prevent future harmful symptoms. But, as Dr. Felitti
learned in the obesity clinic, addressing symptoms may be futile if the
underlying trauma is not addressed. Recurrent systemic harm will
persist unless systems are held accountable for their underlying trauma.
If BP was a triggered system, gaps existed in the response to the
harms that it inflicted because BP’s organizational trauma was never
addressed directly. BP has a long history of conflict and misery tied to
near-death experiences as a company.152 In 1901, William Knox D’Arcy
gained the right to explore for oil in what is now Iran.153 Seven years of
disease and disappointment later, the Anglo-Persian oil company, as
BP was originally called, discovered oil, but by 1914 the company was
near bankruptcy for the second time, having no purchasers for its oil.154
Britain then invested heavily in the company, and it literally fueled
both the first and second world wars such that “war without oil” was
“unimaginable.”155 During these times, workers on the pipelines and in
the oil fields endured desperate conditions, with considerable food

150. Corp. Risk Holdings L.L.C. v. Rowlands, No. 17-CV-5225(RJS), 2018 WL
9517195, at *2, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018).
151. In re Facebook, Inc. S’holder Derivative Priv. Litig., 367 F. Supp. 3d
1108, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
152. Ishaan Tharoor, A Brief History of BP, Time (June 2, 2010),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1993882,00.html
[https://perma.cc/9R5D-7KBA].
153. Id.
154. Early History, BP, https://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/who-weare/our-history/early-history.html [https://perma.cc/4MQ4-MSCN] (last
visited June 9, 2020).
155. Id.
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shortages, disease, and pestilence. 156 After a democratically elected
government nationalized the company’s holdings in Iran, a joint CIA
and British intelligence operation toppled the government and imposed
a puppet government led by an autocratic Shah,157 who was eventually
overthrown by a revolution that involved taking American hostages.158
Although BP has cast itself as an environmentally conscious com–
pany,159 it has repeatedly acted in ways that harm itself, its workers,
and the environment.
As part of its plea deal following the Deepwater Horizon disaster,
BP was required “to hire two corporate monitors for four years to
supervise safety procedures and to focus on ethics and compliance.”160
There were also “probationary conditions, such as revising their oil-spill
response plan, hiring outside auditors, and disclosing future safety
violations.”161 Like the settlement and regulatory measures following
the disaster at Texas City, these measures would only address the
symptoms of BP’s trauma. Regulatory measures that guided BP to
explore how its past relationships and experiences affect its practices
and reactions, or measures that facilitated reckoning with its past and
acknowledging the effects on present relationships, may have prevented
future harms.
B.

Control Paradigm

Mechanisms for addressing systemic trauma response should
include non-control-based measures. Courts and legislatures generally
approach both individual and systemic trauma-responsive behavior
through a control lens. Historically, the rule of law has sought to resolve
social problems and improve human and planetary conditions by
punishing, deterring, protecting, prohibiting, or regulating particular
acts. These acts include the panoply of criminal, contractual,
intentional, negligent, or productive behaviors that are affected by law
and policy. The archetypal method for addressing social problems, then,
is control. 162 Through the control paradigm, formal law (such as
legislation, regulation or court order), informal law (such as social or
cultural processes and pressure), and markets have been used to resolve
156. Tharoor, supra note 152.
157. Id.
158. Shah flees Iran, History (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.history.com/thisday-in-history/shah-flees-iran [https://perma.cc/CQJ8-75AK].
159. Tharoor, supra note 152.
160. Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2019), appeal denied, 221 A.3d 644 (Pa. 2019).
161. Id.
162. See Arnold S. Rosenberg, Motivational Law, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 111,
114–15 (2008) (discussing use of laws to motivate behavior).

1018

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
Traumatized Systems Theory

social problems and improve human and planetary conditions by
controlling, either negatively or positively, the actions of individuals,
communities, and systems.163 The control paradigm describes both force
that is imposed on systems and force that systems impose on others. In
other words, systems may be both actors and objects in the control
paradigm.
Often, the control paradigm is an effective means of achieving
accountability for conscious behavior. Law and economic theorists, for
example, have suggested that a rational actor may be influenced by
certain forms of control which create costs.164 Critical Race Theorists
and Feminist Theorists have often advocated justice by controlling
racist and misogynistic behaviors using the deterrent and punitive
effects of law. 165 When behavior is unconscious, but still cognitive,
theorists have suggested alternative forms of control, through nudges
and unconscious bias training. 166 However, neuroscientific discoveries
reveal possible limitations in efforts to control.167
Where societal problems are driven to some extent by trauma
response, Traumatized Systems Theory asserts that a paradigm based
exclusively in control may have limited or even adverse effect. Not only
is trauma response unconscious, it is also non-cognitive. Rather than
involving thinking processes (whether conscious or unconscious),
trauma response is instinctual and reflexive, making it more difficult to
control. In addition, control-based approaches are often directed at
symptoms (death, injury, economic harm, or damage to property, for
example) and individual actors, rather than causes and systems. They
also usually take a linear approach to cyclical or multidimensional
circumstances.
The critique of the control paradigm is less about the value of
control and more about considering the futility of control in traumaaffected situations. Like a hydra that grows two heads when one is cut
off, trauma symptoms tend to regenerate in response to controlexclusive approaches. In addition, the critique of the control paradigm
is not about whether there should be accountability, but who is
accountable and what the goals and means of accountability are.
163. Cf. Holden, supra note 14, at 34–41 (describing “causal attribution
theory,” which identifies “the tendency to attribute causality and blame
to person factors”).
164. See Manuel A. Utset, Rational Financial Meltdowns, 10 Hastings Bus.
L.J. 407, 422 (2014) (discussing rational actors).
165. See Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture, and the Biology of Rape: Toward
Explanation and Prevention, 87 Cal. L. Rev. 827, 924 (1999).
166. See Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 103, at 19–22.
167. See Trauma, Am. Psych. Ass’n (June 11, 2015), http://www.apa.org/
topics/trauma/ [https://perma.cc/89GV-4PQ4] (explaining that trauma
can cause people to have unpredictable emotions).
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Traumatized Systems Theory suggests that systems be held
accountable in addition to individuals and that a goal of accountability
should include addressing the trauma symptom-inducing origins in both
systems and individuals. The focus of this article, however, is
traumatized systems.
Examples of non-control-based remedies include some alternative
dispute resolution and restorative justice approaches that focus on
facilitating communication and understanding.168 Effective non-controlbased remedies for traumatized systems is an area for research and
development. Different remedies may be appropriate for different
systems. Some initial thoughts about remedies are discussed later in
this article. Some remedies for traumatized systems will necessarily
involve control because stropping the harm is an important aspect of
starting to heal.
C.

Inverse Accountability

Systemic trauma produces systemic trauma response, which may
harm the system itself, other systems, individuals, and communities.
And harms suffered by individuals and communities may produce
additional trauma responses. While the trauma response of
organizations is not acknowledged in law and policy, trauma response
in individuals is well-documented. 169 There are many ways that
individual trauma survivors of systemic harm pay a price for their
trauma response. Individual trauma survivors often suffer adverse
physical and mental health, disproportionate rates of incarceration, and
difficulty in forming and sustaining healthy relationships, for
example.170
Traumatized Systems Theory characterizes this phenomenon as
inverse accountability because individual victims of systemic trauma
are held accountable for their resulting trauma response, and not the
systems that traumatized them. For example, Megan Glynn Crane tells
168. See Alberstein, supra note 111, at 31; Susan K. Serrano, Eric K. Yamamoto,
Melody Kapilialoha MacKenzie & David M. Forman, Restorative Justice for
Hawai‘i’s First People: Selected Amicus Curiae Briefs in Doe v.
Kamehameha Schools, 14 Asian Am. L.J. 205, 218–19 (2007) (describing an
“educational program by Hawaiians for Hawaiians” as an effort to repair
historical and continuing harm); Cheryl Niro, Healing Victims, Offenders
and Communities: Restorative Justice, 87 Ill. Bar J. 568, 569 (1999)
(discussing restorative justice in the criminal context). But see Annalise
Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative
Justice 16–18 (2004) (critiquing restorative justice).
169. See, e.g., Genevieve Frances Steel, Constructing the Trident of the
Reasonable Person: Enough Is Enough! It’s Time for the Reasonable Indian
Standard, 12 Elon L.J. 62, 64 (2020) (proposing a “reasonable Indian
standard” due to historical trauma).
170. See discussion of trauma response, supra Part II.
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the story of a client, an adolescent boy, who had been subject to
traumatizing criminal interrogations. 171 Although her focus is the
trauma caused by the criminal justice system’s interrogation of
juveniles, the story that she tells describes inverse accountability—a
child being held accountable, through interrogation, for his response to
previous victimization by systemic actors. Professor Crane recounts:
Before he was picked up by police, his life was colored by neglect,
maltreatment, and several specific incidents of trauma. His father
had never been in the picture and he was raised by a crackaddicted mother, sometimes with the help of his crack-addicted
grandmother. In the months leading up to his arrest, he had been
breaking into his neighbors’ homes to steal food because his
mother had spent all of their money on drugs instead of groceries.
My client’s school records and documented comments from his
teachers indicated that what he endured at home had a pervasive
and ongoing impact on his cognitive, emotional, and social
functioning.172

In other words, Professor Crane’s client was the progeny of an
unbroken, multigenerational chain of trauma. Multiple organizations
and systems harmed Professor Crane’s client before he entered the
interrogation room. Systems that should ensure that illegal drugs are
not available for purchase, that are responsible for identifying those in
need of drug treatment and helping them, that are responsible for
educating and protecting children, and that are responsible for
supporting families all failed—or worse facilitated the trauma to her
client. His response to those systemic harms was, among other things,
criminal behavior.
The systems that harmed this child were not, in all likelihood, held
accountable in any way. Instead, the child was held accountable for
these systems’ actions and failures—“repeatedly interrogated by the
police over the course of two days—including middle-of-the-night
interrogations, without a parent or any other interested adult
present.”173 According to Professor Crane: “despite access to detailed
information regarding the sad history of his childhood, neither his
defense attorney, nor the forensic psychologist who examined him, nor
the judge who admitted and found his confession credible, recognized

171. Megan Glynn Crane, Childhood Trauma’s Lurking Presence in the
Juvenile Interrogation Room and the Need for a Trauma-Informed
Voluntariness Test for Juvenile Confessions, 62 S.D. L. Rev. 626, 630
(2017).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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that my client’s traumatic history might have made him vulnerable in
the interrogation room.”174
Inverse accountability, then, means that individuals are held
accountable for the outcomes of trauma caused by systems. Inverse
accountability begins with a traumatized system. 175 When traumaresponsive behavior of a traumatized system results in harm to
individuals, the effects may be physical or emotional damage. Often,
this damage is uncompensated, and individuals must bear the cost.
Even when individuals receive compensation, it does not undo the
damage, which may have lasting and multigenerational implications.
That is inverse accountability. In addition, the harm to individuals may
be traumatic and lead to trauma response in individuals, resulting in
self-harm or harm to others which often results in punishment. That
also is inverse accountability.
The tragedy of inverse accountability from a policy perspective is
that holding individual victims accountable for the harms of
traumatized systems is not only unjust, it is also futile and wasteful.
Since individuals did not originate the chain of harmful behavior,
punishing them will not stop future harmful behavior over time.
Focusing on accountability for the offending system would have a much
broader and lasting effect. Of course, systems often experience some
repercussions for their harm—media coverage, scathing editorials,
termination of an administrator or two, program changes. But tweaks
and “fixes” to traumatized systems will have only temporary benefit.
Systems transformation is also necessary.

V. Regulation of the Systemic Mind
Using law to transform trauma in the systemic mind follows from
longstanding precedent taking account of the organizational mind in
other contexts. Recognizing the influence of trauma on organizations
and groups of organizations would be a reasonable doctrinal approach
because the personification of organizations is well-established in law,
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., Timothy W. Bjorkman, A State in Shackles: The Effect of A
Dysfunctional Childhood on Crime and Imprisonment, 62 S.D. L. Rev.
211, 245 (2017) (discussing ingrained state practices that tend to exacerbate
jail and prison crowding and destabilize lives); Lucia H. Seyfarth, Child
Soldiers to War Criminals: Trauma and the Case for Personal Mitigation,
14 Chi.-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 117, 135 (2013) (advocating mitigation
due to trauma for child soldiers); Tamar R. Birckhead, Children in
Isolation: The Solitary Confinement of Youth, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev.
1, 1–4, 1 n.5 (2015) (discussing how adult imprisonment of youth often leads
to harsh punishment and trauma response, particularly in New York, where
juvenile court ends at age 15).
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and courts and policymakers routinely consider the organizational mind
when attempting to control organizational behavior. These controls,
however, have limited their focus to cognitive aspects of the
organizational mind, either conscious or unconscious. Traumatized
Systems Theory asserts that control and non-control-based remedies
must also address the non-cognitive, trauma-responsive aspect of the
systemic mind. Individual trauma survivors are often held inversely
accountable for systemic harms. And although many courts and
policymakers have developed trauma-informed approaches to individual
behavior, 176 they have not fashioned trauma-informed remedies to
address systemic harm.
From conflict within families, workplaces, and schools to conflict
between racial, religious, and ethnic groups to conflict between nations,
trauma response and traumatized systems are influencing forces to
varying degrees. Attempts to address some systemic behavior will be
insufficient as long as courts and policymakers limit their consideration
of the organizational mind to organizations’ cognitive processes,
whether conscious or unconscious. Instead, courts and policymakers
should also consider the non-cognitive reality of organizations and the
implications of systemic trauma-induced behavior.
A.

Personification Revisited

Systems’ accountability has often depended on an explicit
personification of systems. In personifying organizations, courts often
consider the organizational mind, the thinking and psychology of the
organizational community apart from the thinking of individual
members or agents of the community. Courts have also admitted
evidence on cognitive error and unconscious thinking of organizations.
Traumatized Systems Theory suggests that these considerations are
incomplete because they do not consider unconscious, non-cognitive,
trauma-affected processes of systems, as they do conscious and
unconscious cognitive processes. This section reviews courts’ and
legislatures’ personification of organizations and liability resulting from
organizational conscious and unconscious thinking.
Corporations provide an example. Both courts and legislatures have
personified corporations, recognizing them as legal persons with rights,
as well as civil and criminal liabilities. Justice Stevens recounted the
history of corporations in his partial dissent in Citizens United v.

176. See Miriam S. Gohara, In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed
Criminal Defense Can Reform Sentencing, 45 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 5–7 (2018)
(discussing trauma-informed sentencing). See also Erin R. Collins, Status
Courts, 105 Geo. L.J. 1481, 1523–24 (2017) (advocating for the creation of
trauma courts).
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Federal Election Commission. 177 Initially, corporations were viewed
with caution.178 Their charters limited them to the public functions and
services for which they were incorporated.179
Over time, the function, power, and wealth of corporations
expanded. They evolved from chartered entities, restricted to their
public functions, to units that can own property and transact business
like natural persons.180 The point here is not to condone or critique the
personhood of corporations, only to observe this well-established legal
fact181 and hypothesize its implications in this context.
A narrow majority in Citizens United held that corporations have
First Amendment rights of political speech equal to natural persons and
that distinctions in the regulations of speech based on legal versus
natural personhood are unconstitutional.182 The split in Citizens United
was both ideological and conceptual. The ideological split involved
protecting the interests of wealthy corporations versus protecting the
electoral process against corruption and undue influence of wealthy cor–
porations. In his partial dissent, Justice Stevens lamented a departure
from precedent and the potential for corruption and distortions to the
electoral process from unfettered corporate speech and spending.183
The conceptual split in Citizens United involved divergent views of
corporate identity. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that the
majority’s view of corporate identity was that corporations represent
the collective interests of its members and shareholders. 184 He
characterized corporations as an “association of individuals.” 185 The
dissent, on the other hand, viewed corporations as inanimate entities
whose political influences may not always represent the interests of
shareholders. Justice Stevens’ dissent warned:

177. 558 U.S. 310, 427–28 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
178. Id. at 427.
179. Id. at 427–28.
180. See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in
American Law, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441, 1472 (1987); see also Suzanna
Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1121, 1123
(2000).
181. In Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company, the
Supreme Court held without argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause applies to corporations. 118 U.S. 394, 394–95
(1886).
182. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319 (majority opinion).
183. Id. at 465–66 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
184. Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring).
185. Id.
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[C]orporations have no consciences, no beliefs, no feelings, no
thoughts, no desires. Corporations help structure and facilitate
the activities of human beings, to be sure, and their “personhood”
often serves as a useful legal fiction. But they are not themselves
members of “We the People” by whom and for whom our
Constitution was established.186

The conceptual split in Citizens United is consistent with divergent
views of the corporate person in other judicial decisions, legislative
policy, and legal theory. Corporate identity tends to take one of three
forms: the collective form (horizontal identity), described by Justice
Scalia’s concurrence in Citizens United;187 an inanimate legal fiction,
discussed in the partial dissent; or a top-down reflection of board
leadership and executive management (vertical identity).
Divergent views of corporate identity have resulted from the
evolution of organizational structure in the United States.188 During the
late nineteenth century and early twentieth century organizational
identity transformed. 189 The application of the concept of scientific
management, made famous by Fred Taylor, resulted in the proliferation
of hierarchical and authoritarian-styled businesses. 190 “[S]cientific
management’s basic aim was to establish breathtaking new powers over
the management of the firm, and indeed over workers themselves, and
to persuade employees and the public that managers were properly
responsible for even the most minute details of the production
process.”191
The emergence of scientific management meant that many
organizations did not just grow organically, arriving by happenstance.
Instead, the structure and operation of organizations was consciously
and meticulously designed. The influence of scientific management
produced a vertical, top-down corporate identity as opposed to a
horizonal view of corporations as a collective community.
Judicial perceptions of corporate identity, as either vertical or
horizontal, tend to affect the view of the organizational mind and the
likelihood of corporate liability.192 Despite Justice Stevens’s observation
186. Id. at 466 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. Id. at 392 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188. John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise
Liability, Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2003) (“The central ideas of enterprise
liability found their first significant expression . . . in the efforts of late
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century engineers to remake the firm.”).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Paul B. Maslo, The Case for Semi-Strong-Form Corporate Scienter in
Securities Fraud Actions, 108 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 95, 98

1025

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
Traumatized Systems Theory

that corporations have no consciences, beliefs, feelings, thoughts or
desires, the personification of corporations has produced judicial
decisions that have considered liability for organizations based on
various theories of corporate cognition.193 In general, organizations may
be held vicariously liable for the actions or omissions of agents acting
within the scope of employment to benefit the organization when the
agent’s intent or mental state can be imputed to the corporation.194
However, some scholars and policymakers have articulated theories for
considering the thought processes of organizations separate and apart
from the intent or cognition of any agent. 195 These theories of
organizational cognition involve both conscious thought and
unconscious or automated cognitive processes.
B.

Conscious Systemic Cognition: Accountability for Conscious
Organizational Thinking

What does it mean for an organization—a system or subsystem—
to engage in conscious thought? How has the law held systems
accountable for conscious cognition?
The organizational mind and organizational consciousness as
discussed here mean that courts and legislatures consider the knowledge
and intent of the organization, as if it were a natural person. Separate
and apart from the knowledge and intent of individual members or
agents, the organizational community has a conscious, thinking mind.
Courts and scholars have considered theories for holding organizations
accountable in both criminal and civil law for actions resulting from the
conscious thoughts of the organizational community.
1.

Organizational Criminal Liability for Conscious Cognition

Criminal liability usually requires a particular mental state, mens
rea, the state of mind that the prosecution must prove that the
defendant had in order to obtain a conviction.196 Historically, organ–
izations have been free from most criminal prosecution in the absence

(2010). See also Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazábal, The Locus of
Corporate Scienter, 2006 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 81, 83 (2006) (“Like the
mythical multiheaded monster, Hydra, a corporation has many minds.”).
193. For an extensive discussion of corporate mental states, see Mihailis E.
Diamantis, Corporate Criminal Minds, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2049,
2067–74 (2016).
194. Melissa Ku & Lee Pepper, Corporate Criminal Liability, 45 Am. Crim.
L. Rev 275, 277 (2008).
195. See Diamantis, supra note 193, at 2071–74.
196. Blake
Weiner,
Kimberly
Austin,
John
Lapin
&
Mary
McCullough, Corporate Criminal Liability, 55 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 961, 964
(2018).
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of proof that some agent with mens rea violated the law.197 Sometimes
organizational culpability is tied to perceptions of organizational
identity, whether an organization is hierarchically structured or
whether thinking is spread across the organization. In top-down
organizations, culpability is tied to the mens rea of key executives.198
However, criminal culpability does not require a vertical perception of
organizational identity, linked to the thinking and actions of an agent.
The “collective knowledge” doctrine, for example, “imputes to a
corporation the aggregate constructive knowledge of all or some of its
employees for the purpose of creating the necessary guilty intent, or
scienter.” 199 Under the collective knowledge doctrine, “the acts of a
corporation are ‘simply the acts of all of its employees operating within
the scope of their employment.’” 200 According to the collective
knowledge doctrine, a corporate defendant has “constructive knowledge
of any material fact learned by its agents and officers during the scope
of their employment” and “may be liable even if no single employee is
entirely at fault.”201 This approach “prevents corporations from evading
liability by compartmentalizing and dividing employee duties.” 202
Under the collective knowledge doctrine, organizational identity is
horizontal, as the organizational community or collective. 203 Culpa–
bility, then, may be based on the knowledge and thinking processes of
the collective.
In some cases, courts have found that organizations had “collective
knowledge” sufficient to establish mens rea, even when no responsible
agent could be identified.204 In Commonwealth v. Springfield Terminal
197. See Kathleen F. Brickey, Conspiracy, Group Danger and the Corporate
Defendant, 52 U. Cin. L. Rev. 431, 448 (1985).
198. See Diamantis, supra note 193, at 268–69 (discussing corporate mens rea).
199. Bailey Wendzel, Matthew Angelo, Mariana Jantz & Alexis
Peterson, Corporate Criminal Liability, 56 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 671, 680
(2019).
200. Id. at 681 (quoting United States v. Bank of New England, N.A, 821 F.2d
844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Diamantis, supra note 193, at 2077–80 (discussing corporate mens
rea based on recent discoveries in cognitive science).
204. Brickey, supra note 197, at 448 (citing Inland Freight Lines v. United
States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir. 1951)) (“The mechanism used to hold
a corporation liable for crimes requiring a culpable mental state absent
[proof of a responsible agent] is imputation to the corporation of the
‘collective knowledge’ of the employees as a group.”); United States v.
T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974); United States
v. Sawyer Transp., Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29, 30–31 (D. Minn. 1971), aff’d, 463
F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1972).
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Railway Company (and seven companion cases), four corporate
defendants were convicted of failing to satisfy a statutory requirement
of reporting the release of hundreds of gallons of diesel fuel, spilled from
a freight locomotive.205 The defendants argued that mens rea had not
been established because prosecutors had not proven that “an agent or
employee imputed to the corporation by the doctrine of respondeat
superior” had knowledge of the spill.206 On appeal, the court held that
for a statutorily created mens rea requirement of mere knowledge,
collective knowledge of employees or agents was sufficient.207
This collective-knowledge approach has not been universally
adopted, however.208 In addition, some scholars note that the collectiveknowledge doctrine concerns knowledge and not specific intent.209 They
caution that “[o]nly when an employee possesses a particular state of
mind can a corporation be held to have that particular state of mind.”210
Yet examining organizational cognition in this context, independent of
the conscious cognition of any agent, is something that courts and
scholars have considered.211
2.

Corporate Civil Liability for Conscious Cognition

In addition to criminal liability, conscious thinking processes of
organizational communities are currently a factor in civil liability.
Examples may be found in the cases involving securities statutes. Under
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), 212
plaintiffs must plead that the corporate defendant had a particular state
of mind in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 creates a private right of
action for purchasers and sellers of securities who are harmed by
deceptive practices. 213 Section 10(b) of the act prohibits the use of

205. Commonwealth v. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 951 N.E.2d 696, 701–03
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011).
206. Id. at 704.
207. Id. at 706.
208. See Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 697 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
Matthew L. Mustokoff, Secondary Actors, Respondeat Superior and the
Limitations of Corporate Scienter: The Seventh Circuit’s Pugh Decision,
36 Sec. Reg. L.J. 237, 238–42 (2008).
209. Wendzel et al., supra note 199, at 681.
210. Id. at 681–82.
211. See Ku & Pepper, supra note 194, at 284 (discussing collective knowledge
doctrine).
212. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
213. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318
(2007).
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deceptive practices,214 and Rule 10b-5 implements the act by further
defining the prohibition.215 To deter frivolous or abusive suits under the
act, Congress enacted the PSLRA.216 The PSLRA raises the pleading
requirement for securities fraud above what had previously been
required for fraud claims by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).217
Under the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard, any complaint
alleging false or misleading statements must: 1) “specify each
statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading,”218 and 2) “state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.”219
Because the PSLRA requires proof of the state of mind of corporate
defendants, it provides evidence of precedent for legal accountability of
the systemic mind. And scholarly and judicial interpretations of this
statute provide even more support. In considering plaintiffs’ proof of
the corporate mind, some scholars have asked “where corporate scienter
resides.”220 For example:
Does it reside in the mind of the jailed CEO? In the mind of the
chief financial officer who prepared the report but received a
reduced prison sentence in exchange for his testimony at the
CEO’s trial? In the minds of the regional sales managers, some of
whom falsified numbers included in the fraudulent report? In the
minds of the hundreds of rank and file employees who bought into
the aggressive culture of meeting Wall Street’s financial
performance targets at any and all costs?221

In other words, scienter may reside at many points within the
corporate community.
Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex
Capital Inc. provides an example. 222 In Dynex, Merit, the subsidiary of
214. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018).
215. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5 (2014).
216. § 1, 109 Stat. 737.
217. For fraud, generally, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that “the
circumstances constituting fraud . . . must [be] state[d] with particularity”
but provides that “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a
person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
218. 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(1) (2018) (quoted in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 321 (2007)).
219. § 78u–4(b)(2) (quoted in Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 321).
220. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 192, at 83.
221. Id.
222. 531 F.3d 190, 192 (2d Cir. 2008).
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Dynex, a financial services company, made thousands of risky loans to
purchasers of manufactured homes and then issued securities backed by
the loans between 1996 and 1999. 223 In addition, Dynex and Merit
engaged in a number of questionable practices, including understating
the repossession rate and “‘an internal control deficiency’ related to the
recording of loan losses.” 224 Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division
Pension Fund purchased $450,000 in these securities.225 Shortly after
the securities were issued, purchasers of the manufactured homes began
defaulting on the loans and foreclosure sales fell far short of the loan
amounts.226 “In October 2003, Dynex disclosed that it had understated
the repossession rates on [some of the securities] collateral by
approximately 34%.” 227 This announcement was followed by
downgrades in the securities credit ratings.228 In the end, the price of
the securities decreased by as much as 85%.229 The Teamsters alleged
that Dynex intentionally sought risky loans but failed to disclose this
practice in the bond-offering materials.230 The Teamsters alleged that
“the defendants ‘misrepresented the cause of the bond collateral’s poor
performance; misrepresented the reasons for restating its loan loss
reserves; and concealed the loans’ faulty underwriting.’”231
The district court denied the motion to dismiss even though it did
not find that the plaintiff had pleaded scienter as to “any specific officer
or employee of either [of the defendant companies].”232 In other words,
the district court held that the plaintiff had pleaded scienter in the
corporate mind sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, even though
the plaintiff had not pleaded scienter of any individual employee.233 The
223. Id.
224. Id. at 193.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 192–93.
227. Id. at 193.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (quoting In re Dynex Capital, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 05 Civ. 1897(HB),
2006 WL 314524, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2006)).
232. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 192.
233. Warren R. Stern & Geoffrey A. Starks, Defining Corporate Scienter, Sec.
Litig. Rep., Sept. 2006, at 1 (“The Court refused to infer that the individual
defendants had acted knowingly or recklessly because the allegations did not
show that they received personal benefits from the alleged fraud, did not
identify specific reports to those defendants that contradicted the public
statements, and did not allege that they recklessly underwrote loans or knew
of any identified individual who did.”).
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corporate mind existed independent of its executives and employees for
purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding in Dynex
that pleading scienter only in the corporation was sufficient to survive
a motion to dismiss.234 Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Tellabs, Inc., which clarified the meaning of the requirement that
plaintiff prove a “strong inference” of scienter and defined scienter as
“a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud,”235
the Second Circuit held that a strong inference of scienter could be
presented by pleading the requisite mental state only for the
corporation and not for any individual employee.236 To ultimately prove
corporate liability, however, the court reaffirmed that a plaintiff must
prove that a corporate agent acted with scienter and that the act and
mental state are “attributable to the corporation.” 237 Despite the
possibility of finding organizational scienter, the Second Circuit
reviewed the case de novo and determined that the plaintiff had failed
to establish a strong inference against the corporate defendants. 238
Nevertheless, the case provides precedent for courts’ consideration of
the conscious organizational mind.
C.

Unconscious Systemic Cognition: Accountability for Unconscious
Organizational Cognition

Beyond consideration of conscious cognition in criminal and civil
cases, legal precedent exists for accountability for unconscious systemic
cognition. Consideration of the unconscious or automated actions of
individuals is well-established in the legal theory of behavioral realists
and some judicial decisions. 239 Cognitive psychology explains that
individuals sometimes act due to unconscious thoughts. These
unconscious thoughts are a part of unconscious cognition of “normal”
234. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 192 (vacating the district court’s order, but noting that
“there are circumstances in which a plaintiff may plead the requisite scienter
against a corporate defendant without successfully pleading scienter against
a specifically named individual defendant”).
235. Id. at 194 (quoting Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S.
308, 319 (2007)).
236. Id. at 195.
237. Id. (citing State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 853
(2d Cir. 1981); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 513 F.3d 702,
708 (7th Cir. 2008)).
238. Dynex, 531 F.3d at 196–97.
239. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Disappearing Consumer, Cognitive Bias
and Tort Law, 6 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 9, 23 (2000) (describing
“implicit hierarchies” as “subtly steering the interests of less dominant social
groups to the margins” in the context of law school curricula and explaining
these hierarchies as masked value judgments).
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brain processes. 240 Unconscious cognition, then, is distinct from
behavior based on conscious thoughts of which the individual is aware.
It is also distinct from trauma-motivated behavior, which is neither
thought-based nor conscious.
At least two independent tracks of scholarship have developed
concerning unconscious thought. 241 One track, originating from
behavioral economists, responds to the neoclassical economic models
that assumed that actors behave rationally 242 and pursue a goal of
efficiency. 243 This track explains why actors do not always act
rationally, but instead act according to unconscious, automated
thinking processes, referred to as heuristics.244 Cass Sunstein and other
behavioral economists have described the normal brain processes as
functioning on two levels—System 1, which are fast and automatic
thought processes and System 2, which are slower deliberative thought
processes. 245 The automated functioning of System 1 supports quick
decisionmaking and uses “heuristics, which are mental shortcuts or rules
of thumb that function well in many settings but lead to systematic
errors in others.” 246 Some common System 1 heuristics include:
240. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 Calif. L.
Rev. 969, 972 (2006) (arguing that “in formulating and interpreting legal
rules, legislatures and courts should pay close attention to the best available
evidence about people’s actual behavior” and consider “the behavioral
effects of legal rules”). See also Allan G. King & Syeeda S. Amin, The
Propensity to Stereotype as Inadmissible “Character” Evidence, 27 A.B.A.
J. Lab. & Emp. L. 23, 34 (2011) (explaining that proponents of implicit
bias describe it as “inherently ‘human’”).
241. See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 973 (discussing separate evolutions
of implicit bias scholarship and heuristic bias scholarship).
242. See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Malleable Rationality, 79 Ohio St. L.J.
17, 22 (2018) (describing rational choice theory).
243. See Brendan S. Maher, Regulating Employment-Based Anything, 100 Minn.
L. Rev. 1257, 1300 (2016) (describing use of shortcut strategies rather than
rationality in the context of employment regulation). See also David M.
Driesen, Distributing the Costs of Environmental, Health, and Safety
Protection: The Feasibility Principle, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory
Reform, 32 B.C. Env’t Affs. L. Rev. 1, 58 n.335 (2005) (citing Cass R.
Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48
Stan. L. Rev. 247, 253 (1996)) (discussing behavioral economics in the
context of environmental law). But see Fred S. McChesney, Behavioral
Economics: Old Wine in Irrelevant New Bottles?, 21 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev.
43, 44–49 (2013) (critiquing behavioral economics).
244. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240 at 973–75. See also Michael Selmi, The
Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New Narrative, 50 Ariz. St. L.J.
193, 215 (2018).
245. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 974. See also Selmi, supra note 244, at
215.
246. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 973–74.
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“representativeness heuristic, by which events are seen to be more likely
if they ‘look like’ certain causes,”247 and erroneous “judgments about
potentially harmful events.”248 One suggestion for addressing behavioral
errors based on automated thinking has been to control such
irrationality by “nudging” actors’ unconscious thoughts to rational
choices.249
A second track of scholarship concerns implicit bias—a normal,
automated cognitive process. 250 This scholarship attempts to explain
persistent racism in the absence of de jure discrimination. “[T]he science
of implicit cognition suggests that actors do not always have conscious,
intentional control over the processes of social perception, impression
formation, and judgment that motivate their actions.” 251 While
247. Id. at 974–75.
248. Id. at 975.
249. See Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 103, at 6 (suggesting “choice
architecture” to affect automated cognitive decision making).
250. Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 Duke L.J. 345, 348–49 (2007)
(“Since the late 1980’s, legal scholars have identified various ways in which
unconscious or implicit racial biases influence the legal process.”) (citing
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 331–36 (1987); Anthony
G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific
Foundations, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 945, 946 (2006); Jerry Kang, Trojan
Horses of Race, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1489, 1497–1539 (2005)).
251. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 250, at 946. But see Selmi, supra note
244, at 213–14 (2018) (challenging the idea that implicit bias is actually
unconscious and uncontrollable).
A variety of mental processes function implicitly, or outside of conscious
awareness. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 250, at 947. These include
“implicit memory, implicit perception, implicit attitudes, implicit stereo–
types, implicit self-esteem, and implicit self-concept.” Id. (citations
omitted). Two of these unconscious mental processes—implicit attitudes
(favorable or unfavorable judgments) and implicit stereotypes (unconscious
associations of social groups with particular traits)—function as implicit
bias. Id. at 948, 949, 951.
The Implicit Association Test (IAT) has been widely cited as providing
evidence of implicit bias. Id. at 952. The test measures respondents’
response time in associating certain categories like black and white with
valuations like pleasant and unpleasant. Id. at 952–53. Implicit bias is
measured by variations in response time in associating each category with
positive or negative valuations. Id. at 952. Results indicate that implicit
bias is extremely widespread. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 971. Most
people, including members of traditionally disadvantaged groups, “tend to
prefer white to African-American, young to old, and heterosexual to gay.”
Id. (citing Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 250, at 955, 957–58; Anthony
G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L.K. Schwartz, Measuring
Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test,
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legislatures and regulators historically adopted rules to prohibit
conscious and intentional acts of discrimination, 252 some behavioral
realists advocate remedies for unconscious or implicit bias.253
Most scholarship and policy have focused on implicit bias
individuals, though some scholars have examined unconscious cognitive
influences on a systemic level. 254 Accountability for unconscious
74 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1464, 1474 (1998); Brian A. Nosek,
Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, Harvesting Implicit Group
Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site, 6 Grp. Dynamics:
Theory, Rsch. & Prac. 101, 105 (2002)). While whites showed an
implicit preference for members of their own group, African-Americans did
not, instead having equal proportion of preference for African-Americans
and whites. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at 971 (citing Greenwald &
Krieger, supra note 250, at 956). Research on the relationship between
implicit bias and behavior is ongoing. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 240, at
971–72 (citing Alexander R. Green, Dana R. Carney, Daniel J. Pallin, Long
H. Ngo, Kristal L. Raymond, Lisa I. Iezzoni & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit
Bias in Physicians and its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black
and White Patients, Soc’y of Gen. Internal Med., Sept. 2007, at 1231,
1232; Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris
Guthrie, Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1195, 1197 (2009)). However, many researchers have found that the
IAT is predictive and that there is a correlation between implicit bias and
behavior. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 250, at 961–62. Scholars have
observed the implications of implicit bias in criminal justice and in civil
contexts such as employment discrimination, voting rights, and patent and
trademark. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of
Their Inferior Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and
Race, 46 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 23, 32 (2014) (comparing implicit bias
theory and social dominance theory in the context of criminal justice);
Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in
Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment,
94 Calif. L. Rev. 997, 1057 (2006) (considering the implications of implicit
bias in employment discrimination); Arusha Gordon and Ezra D.
Rosenberg, Barriers to the Ballot Box: Implicit Bias and Voting Rights in
the 21st Century, 21 Mich. J. Race & L. 23, 24–25 (2015) (considering
the implications of implicit bias in voting); Jenna DiJohn, Examining the
Outer-Limits of Trademark Law in the Religious Context and a Potential
Implicit Bias for Non-Secular Litigants: Eller v. Intellectual Reserve, Inc.,
25 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 209, 229 (2014)
(considering the implications of implicit bias in patent and trademark).
252. See Selmi, supra note 244, at 198–99 (describing discrimination).
253. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 250, at 962. But see Selmi, supra note
244, at 197 (challenging the “narrative that contemporary discrimination
is the product of implicit bias that is automatic, unconscious, pervasive,
and beyond one’s control”).
254. Systemic implicit bias is automatic biases in “supposedly race-neutral
legal theories (such as retribution or rehabilitation) and jurisprudential
approaches to well-considered constitutional doctrines (such as Eighth
Amendment excessiveness analysis).” Justin D. Levinson & Robert J.
Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 Yale L.J.F. 406, 408 (2017). Systemic
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systemic cognition is an emerging trend and has generally focused on
corporate culture.255
In some cases, courts have acknowledged that corporate culture
may produce unconscious organizational behavior. As with liability for
conscious organizational cognition, organizations’ liability in cases
involving unconscious cognitions tends to vary with the perception of
corporate identity. Where organizational identity is defined hori–
zontally, as the collective community of the organization, liability is
less likely than when organizational identity is defined vertically, as
executive management.
For example, comments made by executives who are not directly
involved in unlawful behavior may nevertheless be evidence of the
unconscious motivations of the organization. Both Hamblin v. Alliant
Techsystems, Inc.256 and Chirdo v. Mineral Technologies, Inc.257 involve
individual claims of age discrimination. In both cases, the court held
that evidence of corporate culture, in addition to the actions of a
particular employee-agent, was admissible to prove organizational
motive and liability.258
implicit bias is also automatic biases in legal processes such as policing,
jury selection, case triage, and sentencing. See Robert J. Smith, Reducing
Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias Training the
Answer?, 37 U. Haw. L. Rev. 295, 298 (2015) (noting automatic biases
in policing); Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit
Bias in Jury Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the
Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed Solutions, 4 Harv. L. & Pol’y
Rev. 149, 150 (2010) (noting automatic biases in jury selection);
Lawrence, supra note 250, at 942 (theorizing ideology of unconscious
racism); Charles R. Lawrence III, Local Kine Implicit Bias: Unconscious
Racism Revisited (Yet Again), 37 U. Haw. L. Rev. 457, 458 (2015)
(describing racism as more than the actions of individuals); Levinson &
Smith, supra, at 409 (noting automatic biases in sentencing). See also L.
Song Richardson, Systemic Triage: Implicit Racial Bias in the Criminal
Courtroom, 126 Yale L.J. 862, 866 (2017) (reviewing Nicole Van
Cleve, Crook County: Racism and Injustice in America’s
Largest Criminal Court (2016)) (“[I] use the phrase systemic triage
to highlight that all criminal justice system players are impacted by such
expansive criminal justice policies and policing practices—not only public
defenders, but also the entire cadre of courtroom players, including
prosecutors and judges.”).
255. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other
Social Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 111–16 (1997).
256. 636 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001).
257. No. 06-5523, 2009 WL 1118191 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 2009).
258. See, e.g., Hamblin, 636 N.W.2d at 154 (“Here, there is evidence that Toby
Warson, Honeywell’s President of Defense and Marine Systems, made an
ageist remark. Because Warson himself did not actually terminate Hamblin,
the remark is not direct evidence of disparate treatment or pretext. The
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In Hamblin, an executive who was not involved in the employment
decision made an ageist comment. The court observed that “[w]hile a
single remark may be insignificant in itself, the echoing of this remark
in a human resources memorandum and at a managers’ meeting creates
a question as to whether a discriminatory corporate culture existed.”259
The court remarked further that “[d]iscrimination is often the result of
subtle, unconscious predispositions.” 260 The court acknowledged that
corporate culture plays a role in fostering discrimination: “numerous
circuit courts have acknowledged that ‘age discrimination may simply
arise from an unconscious application or stereotyped notions of ability
rather than from deliberate desire to remove older employees from the
workforce’ and on that basis have ruled in the plaintiff’s favor.”261
In other words, corporate culture influenced by unconscious
systemic biases may be the basis for organizational liability. The court
in Chirdo made a similar observation concerning corporate thinking and
culture: “In an employment discrimination case, even a stray remark
by a nondecisionmaker may be admissible. The Third Circuit has
recognized an exception to the general rule that stray remarks are
inadmissible for remarks that reflect ‘a cumulative managerial
attitude.’”262
Evidence of an organization’s corporate culture is evidence of the
organization’s thinking, beliefs, and motives, which may include
unconscious behavior.
Courts have also considered corporate culture and unconscious
corporate cognition in the context of class action suits. The Supreme
Court addressed the theory in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,263 but
rejected it as a basis for certification based on the facts of that case.264
Dukes involved a Title VII sex discrimination class action by former
and current female employees of Wal-Mart, “one of the most expansive
fact that the comment was made by a top executive, however, is significant
because ‘when a major company executive speaks, “everybody listens” in
the corporate hierarchy.’” (first citing Diez v. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 564
N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); and then quoting Lockhart v.
Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir. 1995))).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. (citing Rebecca H. White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive
Matters?: Discrimination in Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making,
61 La. L. Rev. 495, 509 (2001)).
262. Chirdo, 2009 WL 1118191, at *1 (first citation omitted; then quoting
Ryder v. Westinghouse, 128 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1997)).
263. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
264. Id. at 356 (“In a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical scope, it
is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their discretion in
a common way without some common direction.”).
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class actions ever.”265 The District Court and Court of Appeals certified
a class of 1.5 million plaintiffs who alleged that discretionary pay and
promotion resulted in discrimination against women.266
An issue in Dukes turned on class certification. Class certification,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a), among other things,
requires proof of commonality, that the class has common issues of law
and fact.267 Citing General Telephone Co. v. Falcon268 and writing for
the majority, Justice Scalia identified the plaintiffs’ burden as
establishing “‘significant proof’ that Wal-Mart ‘operated under a
general policy of discrimination’” that would be common to all class
members.269
The corporate identity described in Dukes was horizontal. In fact,
the challenged practice was the subjectivity and discretion that
managers had in making promotion decisions under the unconscious
influence of Wal-Mart’s corporate culture.270 To prove commonality, the
plaintiffs relied on expert testimony of Dr. William Bielby concerning
a “‘social framework analysis’ of Wal-Mart’s ‘culture.’”271 Dr. Bielby
testified that Wal-Mart had a “‘strong corporate culture,’ that made it
‘vulnerable’ to ‘gender bias.’”272 Writing in her partial dissent, Justice
Ginsburg explained the unconscious actions of Wal-Mart’s lower
management:
Wal-Mart provides no standards or criteria for setting wages . . .
and thus does nothing to counter unconscious bias on the part of
supervisors.
Wal-Mart’s supervisors do not make their discretionary
decisions in a vacuum. The District Court reviewed means WalMart used to maintain a “carefully constructed . . . corporate
culture,” such as frequent meetings to reinforce the common way
of thinking, regular transfers of managers between stores to ensure
uniformity throughout the company, monitoring of stores “on a

265. Id. at 342.
266. Id. at 343.
267. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
268. 457 U.S. 147, 152 (1982).
269. Dukes, 564 U.S. at 353 (quoting General Telephone Co. v. Falcon, 457
U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
270. Id. at 343.
271. Id. at 346 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc, 603 F.3d 571, 601 (9th
Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
272. Id. at 354 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 152
(N.D. Cal. 2004)).
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close and constant basis,” and “Wal-Mart TV,” “broadcast . . .
into all stores.”273

In other words, the organizational community was under the
influence of a corporate culture that affected the unconscious
decisionmaking of Wal-Mart’s supervisors. Yet because Dr. Bielby
could not identify what percentage of decisions at Wal-Mart were
affected by the culture of stereotyping, the Court concluded that
plaintiffs’ proof was “worlds away” from that needed to establish a
common policy of discrimination at Wal-mart.274
Subsequent to Dukes, lower courts continue to consider unconscious
influences on corporate culture as sufficient to advance plaintiffs’ class
actions. In Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 275 the District Court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a nationwide class of
current and former Costco employees who were denied promotion to
General Manager or Assistant General Manager. 276 Plaintiffs argued
that personnel decisions were affected by unconscious corporate
influences—“social science and cognitive bias research showing that ‘the
Costco culture and subjective promotion processes discriminate against
women.’” 277 Unlike the organizational identity in Dukes, which was
horizontal, the organizational identity of Costco was vertical.
Considering Dukes, the District Court granted class certification on
remand to a modified class.278 The District Court found that: “Costco’s
top management—from Senior VPs up—meets once every four weeks
at company headquarters in Washington. In addition to other matters,
personnel and potential candidates for promotion are ‘frequently
discussed among top-level managers, both at weekly meetings and the
monthly meetings at Costco headquarters in Issaquah, Washington.’”279
So rather than assessing the unconscious thinking of an entire
community of managers across stores, as in Dukes, the plaintiffs in Ellis
challenged Costco’s cognitive processes through its top management.280
273. Id. at 371 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (first
citation omitted; then quoting Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 151–53).
274. Id. at 354–55 (majority opinion).
275. 285 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
276. Id. at 496.
277. Id. at 500–01 (citing Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 240 F.R.D. 627, 640
(N.D. Cal. 2007)).
278. Id. at 503 (describing plaintiffs’ “hybrid class,” requesting injunctive relief
for current employees and monetary relief for former and current
employees).
279. Id. at 497 (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 520. In explaining its conclusion concerning the commonality element,
the court noted that the class in Ellis was much smaller than the class in
Dukes and concerned female employees who were seeking specific positions
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After Dukes, other courts have considered unconscious cognitive
process but determined that they were insufficient to establish
commonality. For example, in In re: Navy Chaplaincy,281 the plaintiffs
sought certification for a class of 2500 present and former non-liturgical
Protestant chaplains in the United States Navy.282 The plaintiffs alleged
that the Navy and several of its officers discriminated on the basis of
religion, maintained a culture of denominational favoritism and
infringed on their First Amendment rights.283
Like the plaintiffs in Dukes, the plaintiffs in In re Navy Chaplaincy
argued that the organization’s cognition and belief system were a
common factor affecting the class. The plaintiffs defined “‘organ–
izational culture’ as a[] ‘set of common understandings,’ composed of
shared ‘values,’ ‘assumptions,’ and ‘beliefs,’ ‘around which action is
organized.’”284 The plaintiffs argued that the “common issue in each
class member’s individual case [was] the Navy’s systemic and
institutionalized culture of prejudice against Non-liturgical chaplains
and the faith groups they represent, and the resulting twin
unconstitutional message of favoritism for preferred denominations and
prejudice” against the plaintiffs.285
The District Court denied class certification, finding that the
plaintiffs did not prove that the “culture of prejudice [was] so strong as
to suggest that the Chaplain Corps operated under a ‘general policy’ of
discrimination.”286 Like the corporate identity in Dukes, the corporate
identity in In re: Navy Chaplaincy was described as “decentralized,”
helping to defeat the use of corporate culture as a common, unconscious,
behavioral motivation.287
Similarly, in Davis v. Cintas Corp., a plaintiff alleged that corporate
culture resulted in discriminatory discretionary decisionmaking by
managers. 288 The circuit court affirmed the district court’s denial of
certification because the hiring process was only partially subjective;
therefore, corporate culture could not have constituted a “general policy

and specific employment practices, rather than all female employees and
practices. Id. at 509. Like Wal-Mart, Costco lacked guidelines, but it
imposed uniform promotion policies and practices. Id. at 498.
281. 306 F.R.D. 33 (D.D.C. 2014)
282. Id. at 46.
283. Id. at 33.
284. Id. at 49 (citation omitted).
285. Id. (citation omitted).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 50.
288. 717 F.3d 476, 486 (6th Cir. 2013)
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of discrimination.” 289 In addition, the corporate identity was the
community of “thousands of Cintas managers at hundreds of Cintas
facilities.”290 The plaintiffs could not establish that behavior spread over
such a diverse collective was driven by common discriminatory
influences.291
Whether or not the courts in these cases found evidence of
commonality that was sufficient for class certification, all of these cases
recognized the possibility of unconscious cognitive processes of
organizations that affected organizational behavior.
The purpose of this discussion has not been to provide an
exhaustive catalogue of the ways that scholars, courts, and policy
makers have considered liability or culpability for the organizational
mind. Instead, the purpose here has been to demonstrate that scholars,
courts, and policy makers have long been accustomed to factoring the
implications of organizational “thinking,” including unconscious
thinking, on organizational behavior and liability.

VI. Traumatized Systems’ Transformation
Eva Rowe felt that BP murdered her parents. Even though the
settlement that she received did not bring her parents back, sometimes,
there is some feeling of justice and satisfaction when the “bad guys”
pay for what they have done.292
Traumatized systems transformation does not offer that same
gratification, in an obvious way. Though traumatized systems may “get
what they deserve” as a result of other available remedies, systems
transformation focusses primarily on understanding and change.
If BP had been diagnosed as a traumatized system when Eva
Rowe’s parents were killed, would a supplemental transformative
remedy, policy, or settlement term have prevented the Deepwater
Horizon disaster?
Maybe.
Transformation involves healing the harms or hurt of the past so
that they do not direct behavior in the present or future. Transfor–
mation is a necessary aspect of accountability for traumatized systems
in at least two contexts: 1) to redress specific harms; and 2) to develop
effective policy with lasting benefits.
289. Id. at 487, 489.
290. Id. at 487 (quoting Serrano v. Cintas Corp., Nos. 04–40132, 06–12311,
2009 WL 910702, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2009)).
291. Id. at 487.
292. Mimi Swartz, Eva v. Goliath, Tex. Monthly (July 2007), https://www.
texasmonthly.com/articles/eva-vs-goliath/ [https://perma.cc/LD3U-SC
4K].
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When claims are brought against traumatized systems for specific
wrongs, transformative remedies should be one part of accountability.
Control-based remedies, including compensatory and punitive damages,
as well as injunctive relief and regulatory sanctions, are necessary to
attempt to make victims whole from the harms of traumatized systems
and to attempt to put an immediate (even if only temporary) stop to
certain harmful practices. If specific harms caused trauma to individuals
or communities, damages, injunctive relief, and regulatory action may
help victims take steps to moderate the effects of trauma and limit the
likelihood of trauma response and inverse accountability.
Control-based remedies, however, are predictably not enough to
address the wrongdoing of traumatized systems or to heal trauma in
the systems or the harm to individual victims. In situations where
systems act out their trauma, in addition to necessary efforts to control
the harm, sanction the system, and compensate the victims, a primary
goal of law and policy should be identifying the underlying causes of
the behavior, holding systems responsible for outcomes, and facilitating
healing systems transformation. A systems-transformation approach
requires accountability that promotes resolution and evolution. In other
words, rather than simply controlling traumatized systems, the goal of
law and policy in creating accountability for systemic trauma response
should be to establish accountability for the traumatic sources and
promote healing and transformation.
Policymakers, therefore, should consider supplemental, transfor–
mative remedies for harms by triggered systems. Where liability has
otherwise been found, supplemental remedies should be available when
plaintiff proves systemic trauma. A plaintiff proves a prima facie case
of systemic trauma by establishing that the organization or system:
1) has a history of trauma; 2) inflicts recurrent harm; and 3) has been
unable to stop its harmful behavior in response to control-based
remedies. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden
shifts to the defendant to prove that some element of the plaintiff’s
prima facie case is not true. If the defendant fails, the plaintiff is entitled
to supplemental, transformative remedies.
Recounting is one possible transformative remedy. Recounting
means that the organization or organizational group would be required
to explore its trauma history and how that history may have affected
departments and operations. The defendant would be required to
provide that information to the plaintiff. In addition to any damages
award, making a plaintiff whole includes allowing that plaintiff to
understand better what happened, that the plaintiff may have been
harmed because the defendant’s behavior is influenced by some past
harm or hurt and the defendant’s recurring responses to it.
Awareness from recounting may be a form of relief for both
traumatized systems and survivors of systemic harm. Understanding
that organizational harm is a trauma response allows everyone involved
to shift perspective. Some attention then goes to examining the origins
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of the organizational trauma, seeing patterns of organizational trauma
response and harm, and viewing individuals and communities as
survivors of systemic cyclical harm. Awareness and acknowledgement
of systemic trauma may empower individuals and communities to
better understand their circumstances and empower everyone involved
to find solutions.
Another potential transformative remedy is repairing. Repairing
involves periodic reports to a plaintiff concerning steps that the
defendant is taking to replace harmful patterns within affected
departments with positive and collaborative alternatives. Knowing that
the plaintiff’s injury has been a catalyst for positive change may assist
in making some plaintiffs whole.
Repairing may also increase justice outcomes for traumatized
systems. By understanding how trauma history affects its decisions and
operations, traumatized systems may improve the conditions for some
individuals working in the system and improve the performance and
efficiency of the system. BP, for example, is currently undergoing a
massive transformation from a fossil-fuel focus to a renewable-energy
focus.293 As a result, “geologists, engineers and scientists have been cut
to less than 100 from a peak of more than 700 a few years ago.”294 If
BP is a traumatized system and CEO Bernard Looney’s climate
revolution transformation addresses BP’s trauma history, then BP may
be able to break free of old patterns. But if BP is a traumatized system
and the transformation does not address BP’s history of trauma, then
BP’s recurrent harm will continue in some form in the context of
producing renewable energy.
Recounting and repairing acknowledge the relationships that are
created when systems harm individuals or communities. Acknowledging
the relationships helps to ground the trauma in time and place, so that
it does not travel forward into a plaintiff’s or defendant’s future, like
other traumas from the past.
A third possible transformative remedy for specific wrongs may be
the development of theories of extended liability for systemic harms.
Science reveals that trauma has multigenerational effects.295 One study
showed that the infant children of mothers who experienced childhood
trauma displayed “altered brain circuitry” for fear response and
293. Ron Bousso, BP’s oil exploration team swept aside in climate revolution,
Reuters (Jan. 24, 2021, 7:13 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usoil-exploration-bp-insight/bps-oil-exploration-team-swept-aside-in-climaterevolution-idUSKBN29U00C?feedType=mktg&feedName=businessNews&
WT.mc_id=Partner-Google [https://perma.cc/9YM4-TFRJ].
294. Id.
295. See, e.g., Childhood Neglect Leaves Generational Imprint, Neuroscience
News (Jan. 19, 2021), https://neurosciencenews.com/childhood-neglectgenerational-17597/ [https://perma.cc/JM5B-LKYX].
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anxiety.296 Systemic harms, then, may foreseeably injure a subsequent
generation. Currently, the remedies for those harms are available to the
direct victims and their beneficiaries. Transformative theories of
extended liability provide a rule of thumb that harm to subsequent
generations is foreseeable. It would not only help to alleviate some
aspects of inverse accountability, it would also help to give a truer and
more complete perspective of outcomes, consequences, and relation–
ships, which might facilitate healing.
These transformative remedies and the burden-shifting method of
awarding them are just one set of potential methods of addressing
specific harms of traumatized systems. More research is needed.
In addition to addressing specific wrongs, a transformative
approach is necessary for creating effective social policies with lasting
benefits. Policy should attempt to advance change without triggering
systems or communities. To the extent that triggering traumatized
systems or communities cannot be avoided, policy should anticipate
trauma-responsive behavior and incorporate compassionate contin–
gency measures that facilitate healing and policy objectives.
More research is needed for developing transformative policy
approaches, and the nature of the transformative approach will depend
on whether it is implemented on a federal, state, local or organizational
level. Nevertheless, as a general matter, transformative policies should
seek to identify recurrent harm. Systems tracing may be one way of
identifying recurrent harm. Systems tracing involves tracking the
organizations that interacted with or influenced individuals who are
harmed or who harm others and holding the systems accountable if the
evidence indicates a strong correlation. Systems tracing begins to build
capacity to address the problem of inverse accountability. It assumes
that many harms result from systemic causes.
For example, consideration of mitigating factors, such as childhood
trauma, is a well-established aspect of sentencing in capital cases. Many
Supreme Court cases have discussed the role of mitigation in capital
sentencing.297 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that an Ohio
statute that limited the factors considered in capital cases violated the
Eight and Fourteenth Amendment requirement that the sentencer be
allowed to consider any aspect of a defendant’s character or record in
all but the rarest cases.298
Just as the criminal justice system sometimes considers the trauma
history of some convicted individuals, systems tracing simply carries
that process a few steps further. By asking what systems took part

296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 105 (1982).
298. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).

1043

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 71·Issue 3·2021
Traumatized Systems Theory

through omission or commission in a harmed or harmful individuals’
trauma history, evidence of recurrent systemic trauma may appear.
Traumatized systems tracing builds on the theory of trauma
systems therapy, which attempts to provide trauma-informed care for
individuals by examining the systems that affect the individual. 299
Similarly, Therapeutic Jurisprudence considers the interaction of legal
processes and the therapeutic needs and inputs of clients and
practitioners300 in order to advocate for a multidisciplinary approach
that could produce positive therapeutic effects on stakeholders. 301
Traumatized systems tracing takes these considerations a step further,
considering the implications for healing in the systems as well as the
individuals.
When recurrent systemic harm occurs, policy makers should
routinize exploration of the system’s trauma history and how that
history affected departments and branches of the system and their
practices. Policies should assist traumatized systems in developing
transparency as a method of healing for both the system and those
affected by it. Policies should encourage traumatized systems to
anticipate their trauma responsive behaviors and how those reactions
will affect individuals and communities. Policies should encourage
traumatized systems to practice alternative, positive patterns to
reprogram what would otherwise be instinctive, responsive behaviors.

Conclusion
This article theorizes addressing many persistent social problems
by directing attention to some of the most insidious actors—
traumatized systems. To help victims of traumatized systems, this
article has suggested transformative accountability for triggered
systems, in addition to control. Many areas of investigation remain,
including the development of methodologies for identifying and healing
traumatized systems, for effectively balancing control and healing, and
for addressing interconnected systems.

299. See discussion of Trauma Systems Theory, supra Part IV.
300. Marla Kahn, Jurisprudential Countertransference, 18 Touro L. Rev. 459,
473 (2015).
301. Id. at 473–76.
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